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EJPAE

Editorial

9th issue of the European Journal of Philosophy in Arts Education

Ketil Thorgersen
Editor in Chief

EJPAE is happy to publish a new issue with fresh perspectives in the intersection between learning/education, the arts/aesthetics, and philosophy/theory. It feels good, and at the same time strange, to publish articles about learning and the arts in a European journal, when at the same time Europe is at war. In a situation where Putin, an anti-democratic despot, invades a neighbouring country, killing and torturing innocent people, learning and the arts may seem trivial. It is my absolute belief, however, that in times of despair, the arts are seminal in creating meaning for people, both on a personal level and on a societal level. One of my favourite explanations to what purpose art has, comes from Deleuze and Guattari's book *What is Philosophy,* where they suggest that art is supposed to offer genuinely new perspectives to the world. Art is this book compared with science and philosophy – all three human activities that aim to construct meaning, albeit with complementary purposes: Philosophy should aim to propose new terms that will allow for new ways of thinking about the world, science should pick the world apart to make visible the parts from which (parts of) the world are becoming, and art aims to present whole new worlds for us that may lure us into turning our world-views

around. EJPAE is a journal that combines these three human endeavours for meaning-making. Articles presented here should therefore both deconstruct, create, and suggest new ways of thinking about the world. What could be more appropriate in times of confusion and turbulence?

This time, the issue comprises of three articles with very different perspectives and topics: Texture matched with phenomenology; Ethics in music education matched with Martha Nussbaum; Practising in music matched with ancient Greek philosophy and again Nussbaum. There are altogether five authors writing these three articles, from Greece, Norway and Sweden.

The first article is an intriguing dive into a pool of texture. *Eva Alerby* and *Kari Doseth Opstad* discuss how the arts can understand learning in the arts through how we sense the world as and with texture. To discuss this, they employ the theoretical arsenal of Dufrenne and Merleay-Ponty. "[...] texture is the difference that makes the difference", they write and argues that there is nothing that can be experienced or thought that is not sensed – and sensing involves texture. In the article, we meet a student group that experience working with texture, mixed with philosophical reflections on aspects of learning in and through texture. And in the end, it becomes clear that "[...] texture encourages or brings out the attention, awareness and sensitivity that are of significance not only for (arts) education, but also for the formation of society—for the formation of our lives."

The second article also reports on student work. *Theocharis Raptis.* The article *Emotions in music education as an ethical issue* reflect over ethical issues of working with emotions in kindergarten music education. Nussbaum is used to talking about how students and teachers can construct an education that strengthens the emotional competence of kindergarten teacher students – and in turn the children and herein also citizens. As Raptis argues, emotions are central to why music is important, and also that psychological research shows that music inflicts emotions. On the surface,

this may seem trivial, but how should and could teachers deal with the more problematic feelings that could arise in a child? What if music opens up for trauma or sets off aggression? Raptis argues convincingly that through conscious and careful music educational work, children can learn to become aware of their emotions and learn to deal with and trust even the more problematic ones.

The third article in this issue is by Robin Rolfhamre and Inga Marie Nesmann-Aas. The article *Rethinking Music Practise-Sessions beyond Poiesis and Praxis – Towards Practising Democracy* makes the somewhat unexpected connection between practising an instrument and a democratic society. The act of practising music was for long a blank page in the annals of music education. Everyone knew that much practise was needed, but how to teach practising skills, and what constituted such skills was a mystery to those who had not miraculously discovered it somehow. The last thirty or so years, this has changed and there is now quite a lot of research on how to practice and how much one should practice. However, practising a music instrument or song in formal music education, is still oftenmost acting in solitude. This article takes tries out a more collective approach to practising: One that the authors argue will not only make individuals great musicians, but will also help develop a healthy democratic society.

I have really enjoyed challenging myself in the meeting with these articles, and I hope you will too.

Ketil Thorgersen

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EJPAE

Texture and (Arts) Education - Encouraging Attention, Awareness and Sensitivity

Eva Alerby

&

Kari Doseth Opstad

Luleå University of Technology

&

UiT - The Arctic University of Norway

Abstract

In this article, the complexities of the concept of texture and its relationship to (arts) education, here with a specific focus on attention, awareness and sensitivity, are explored and elaborated upon. Texture can be described simply as the visual and tactile character of surfaces, which covers both nature and culture and, indeed, much of life itself. The overall aim of the article is to explore the following: (i) (arts) education through the lens of texture; (ii) texture, education and the arts as they relate to bodily and sensory experiences; and (iii) texture and (arts) education in relation to silence, silent spaces and repetition. The ultimate goal is to develop theoretical and philosophical insights into diverse understandings of texture as they relate to (arts) education as a way to illuminate and sharpen the sentience and appreciation of its meaning and importance for students in the classroom. The article is theoretically founded on the thinking of the French philosophers Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Mikel Dufrenne. The ways in which texture, education and the arts are related to bodily and sensory experiences are outlined and discussed, which is followed by an exploration of silence, silent spaces and repetition as essential elements of both texture and education. The discussion is exemplified by a narrative, here in the form of a paradigmatic case, of students examining texture in the classroom. To conclude, texture encourages or elicits attention, awareness and sensitivity, all of which are of significance not only for (arts) education, but also for the formation of society—for the formation of our lives.

Keywords: *Texture, (arts) education, bodily and sensory experiences, silent spaces, repetition*

Texture and (Arts) Education

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Encouraging Attention, Awareness and Sensitivity

Eva Alerby [1] & Kari Doseth Opstad[2]

Openings for Continuation

All humans encounter the world through their bodies. Humans bodily inhabit the world; humans and the world cannot be separated (Merleau-Ponty 2002). In the same way—or to paraphrase the words of Merleau-Ponty—students (and teachers) encounter school through their bodies. They bodily inhabit the school; students and the school cannot be separated. In turn, these encounters require bodily experiences of sensing the world (or the school) in a variety of ways as prerequisites; indeed, this is crucial for teaching and learning, education and schooling—for knowledge creation in general. Essential for schooling is, however, to be observant of the fact that education is not just about creating knowledge regarding a subject but that it is equally about becoming human through the life of education (Biesta 2006).The acquisition of education, knowledge and

1 Alerby, Eva: Luleå University of Technology, Department of Health, Education and Technology: Eva.Alerby@ltu.se
2 Opstad, Kari Doseth: UiT - The Arctic University of Norway, Department of Education: kari.doseth.opstad@uit.no

experience happens in relation to the social context and interpersonal relationships, but also in relation to physical things, for example, different materials—through sensory and bodily experiences. This is stimulated through rich access to different materials, qualities and textures, in which the variety of tactile experiences is transformed into bodily knowledge. Small children use their hands to touch different things and surfaces, often using their mouths as well. By crawling on the floor or ground, which consists of different textures, the child acquires an increasing number of sensory impressions and experiences and, consequently, learns more about their surroundings and self. The need to retain the child's momentary awareness of natural somatic and aesthetic sensibility so that this awareness can develop throughout life was emphasised by Doodington (2014). Increasing a child's bodily control is important because this leads to the development of bodily consciousness, which suggests 'the cultivation of a specific form of aesthetic awareness' (Doodington 2014, 53).

In the struggle to acquire awareness, experience, understanding and knowledge of the world, the body is undeniably important, and so is texture. The human body itself is a landscape of textures that manifest on the skin, with all its wrinkles, hair, softness or dryness, or even nails, with their sharpness or bluntness. People are often described according to their body's textures, but they are also identified by the textures of their bodies, for example, by using their fingerprints.

Given this, texture is the difference that makes the difference. Texture may even be more effective and meaningful than we realise; it may encourage attention, awareness and sensitivity, thereby being of significance for (arts) education (Opstad and Alerby, 2017).

What is to Come: Aims and Theoretical Considerations

In the current article, the complexities of the concept of texture in relation to (arts) education[3], with a specific focus on attention, awareness and sensitivity, will be elaborated upon. The overall aim is to explore the following: (i) (arts) education through the lens of texture; (ii) texture, education and the arts as they relate to bodily and sensory experiences; and (iii) texture and (arts) education in relation to silence, silent spaces and repetition. The ultimate goal is to develop theoretical and philosophical insights into the diverse understandings of texture as they relate to (arts) education as a way to illuminate and sharpen the sentience and appreciation of its meaning and importance for students in the classroom.

Theoretically, the present article is predominantly based on the thinking of the French philosophers Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Mikel Dufrenne, who were both active and influential in the phenomenological movement. Merleau-Ponty is likely best known for his theory of the lived body (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Merleau-Ponty and Lefort 1968). Merleau-Ponty (1995) also stressed that not everything can be communicated verbally; some things are unspeakable because they exist in a manner beyond what can be described, which he called silent and implicit language. Nevertheless, this silent and implicit language can appear through visual presentations, such as

3 In the framework of this article, 'arts' is within brackets—(arts)—as a way to illuminate and highlight that *all* education embraces the arts in different forms and also that we consider education and arts education in a holistic way. Given this, the arts are not exclusively for arts education, even though the arts are an obvious and indisputable part of arts education—the very essence of arts education. Without the arts in arts education, there would be no arts education. However, from a holistic perspective, the arts are also essential for education as a whole and, vice versa, independent of the subject (cf. Ministry of Education and Research, 2019; Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2020.

different kinds of (art) forms: a picture, a photograph, a sculpture or a *texture*. Meanwhile, Dufrenne (1973) is well known for his work on aesthetic experiences, and he emphasised the rich diversity of sensory impressions, feelings and expressions that aesthetic experiences embrace. He also claimed that aesthetic experiences lead to an emotional response that makes the surroundings visible for the individual. According to Dufrenne (1973), aesthetic experience is characterised as helping individuals to see the world and themselves in new ways.

Texture as a concept is an inevitable part of everyday life, as well as of (arts) education and various school activities. By using texture and the experiences of it in different (arts) educational contexts and situations, students may be given the opportunity to explore their creativity, values, attention, awareness, sentience and sensitivity.

In the following sections, we explore complex and multidimensional notions of texture, including an elaboration on the various characteristics of texture, as a foundation. Thereafter, (arts) education is illuminated and discussed through the lens of texture. We illuminate and exemplify the discussion by presenting a narrative in the form of a paradigmatic case of some primary school students examining texture in the classroom.[4] The ways in which texture, education and the arts are related to bodily and sensory experiences are then outlined and discussed, which is followed by an exploration of silence, silent spaces and repetition as essential elements of both texture and (arts) education. In the article, the intertwined relationship of texture and (arts) education is explored and elaborated upon. The discussion is exemplified by and connected to the narrative, which is interwoven within the argumentation throughout the text. Finally, we conclude by arguing that texture is essential for edu-

4 Even though we exemplify and connect the theoretical and philosophical exploration with a narrative regarding primary school students' examination of texture, the present article should not be construed as a purely empirical study. Instead, it should be viewed mainly as a theoretical contribution to the field of (arts) education but with a connection to a classroom situation in the form of a paradigmatic case.

cation and training, teaching and schooling, for formation and transformation and for the formation of society and individuals' lives.

Notions of Texture: Complex and Multidimensional

Texture can be simply described as the visual and tactile characteristics of surfaces, hence covering both nature and culture; indeed, texture covers much of life itself. Within all visual art forms, craft design and architecture, texture is a formal aesthetic tool, much akin to shape and colour. As a professional term, texture is used not only in arts and crafts but also in disciplines such as music, language and gastronomy, though with slightly different meanings (Loan 2002).

As a concept, texture has the same origin as the word 'text': it comes from the Latin word *textus*, which means weave, tissue or spin. According to Vasseleu (2005), a texture is 'a disposition or characteristic of anything which is woven into a fabric, and comprises a combination of parts or qualities which is neither simply unveiled or made up' (12). Different textiles, such as clothes, cloth, fabric and thread, are comprised of texture, but texture can be much more. Absolutely everything in our surroundings has surfaces with different textures, including artefacts, nature, animals and humans. Although we cannot always feel or see texture, we have a variety of expressions for describing it, such as soft, hard, smooth, rough, spiky, uneven and furry (Opstad, 1990, 2011). In contemporary society, particularly in the context of (arts) education, texture is essential for both visual and tactile attention and aesthetic compliance, both of which are aspects that are significant for exploration and creative activities (Opstad and Alerby, 2017).

Different Characteristics of Texture Exploration

Everything in the world—body–mind, outer–inner, subject–object, culture–nature —are intertwined and cannot be separated; they are not 'either or', but 'both and'

(Merleau-Ponty, 2002). This, in turn, means that previous experiences, such as, for example, the sight of a texture, are connected to earlier touches and that touch may refer to earlier sights. However, texture is often divided into two forms of perception based on sight and touch: visual and tactile. Therefore, the texture is perceived with the senses of sight and touch—that is, with the bodies (Opstad, 1990, 2011). Visual texture is linked to the visual perception of surfaces or what can be seen but not felt (even though a visual texture in the form of a photograph, e.g., has a tactile texture in the form of the print's quality-based texture). Meanwhile, tactile texture is linked to one's sense of touch; even though the texture images included in the current article can be regarded as visual, they display tactile textures (e.g., Figure 1)



Figure 1: Tactile texture in different paper grades. Student work by Trine Egerdahl. Photo by Kari Doseth Opstad.

Textures can be created by humans, nature or both. All textures created by humans are either the result of conscious actions with functional and aesthetic intentions or unconscious actions that are the consequence of quotidian human activity—that is,

traces of lived lives. Other external influences that change textures include rain, wind and age (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Examples of a texture created by humans (left), a texture created by nature (middle) and a texture created by a combination of humans and nature (right). Photos by Kari Doseth Opstad.

According to Thiis-Evense (1987), an additional way to describe texture is to divide the concept into three groups based on the quality of the texture: smooth, fine or coarse. Smooth textures seem to be hard, slip away when touched and cannot be grabbed onto. This kind of texture seems unapproachable, and its smoothness becomes like a repelling membrane that gives it an inner value. Glass, shiny metal and polished stone are examples of such surfaces. The fine texture seems soft, and the fine-grained surface is open and does not reject contact. This texture can be experienced as porous and, thus, can have a scratchy effect. The plastered wall is an example of this touch quality. The coarse texture seems to be repellent but in a different way from the smooth texture. Although smoothness protects the interior, a coarse texture brings the interior forward. The expression is aggressive and stands for active resistance. It gives texture stability and heaviness. Rough bricks, natural stone and coarse wood can have this touch quality (Thiis-Evense 1987).

Regardless of whether texture is visual or tactile, is created by humans, nature or both or is smooth, fine or coarse, it can convey both harmony and disharmony. Whether it communicates harmony or disharmony depends on a range of factors, including the composition principles, as well as upon the person's previous experiences and state of mind. The sense of harmony or disharmony can also be because of bodily or tactile reactions when touching the texture. Some textures might be experienced as pleasant to touch—for example, when it comes to striking a smooth and silky cat—while other textures are unpleasant to touch—here regarding touching something cold and wet, which is experienced as slimy (or maybe the texture of the cat is experienced as uncomfortable for some). It all depends on previous experiences of touching. In addition, when touching another person—or even an animal for that matter—the texture of the toucher's hand affects the experience of the one who is touched in different ways and vice versa, here in the same way as Merleau-Ponty (2002) emphasised the mutual interplay between the individual and the world, between subjects and objects. The interplay between the individual and the world reveals, in turn, a dualistic ratio between an autonomous subject and an objective world. Instead, the interplay between the human and the world encroaches upon each other in a 'chiasm' (Merleau-Ponty and Lefort 1968).

(Arts) Education Through the Lens of Texture

Aesthetics are parts of (arts) education and various school activities, most often in the form of the specific subjects governed by school legislation and the curricula for arts subject. However, Lewis (2009) argued that above and beyond the curricula, aesthetics play an essential role in education as a whole. By using aesthetics and experiences of the same in different educational contexts and situations, students are given the opportunity to explore their creativity, values and ethical positions (Dufrenne 1973).

How, then, can the role of aesthetics—and, more specifically, the concept of texture—be explored and elaborated upon in daily school life in the classroom with students? To exemplify and connect the theoretical and philosophical exploration in the current article with an everyday classroom situation, the following narrative of an arts lesson with primary school students will serve as a point of departure for the discussion. The narrative has been constructed as a paradigmatic case by the present researchers based on real events (cf. Pavlich 2010). According to Mills, Durepos and Wiebe (2010), a paradigmatic case is made up of carefully selected examples extracted from the studied phenomena, which, in turn, are based on previous experiences of collective and shared situations and events. Therefore, the following narrative is a depiction of our collective experiences from projects focusing on (arts) education and students' attention, awareness and sensitivity related to their near surroundings in the school and themselves. Throughout the present article, the narrative will be connected to and analysed in relation to theoretical and philosophical exploration.

A Narrative of a Lesson on Texture

A class of ten-year-old students in an ordinary primary school in the northern part of a Nordic country is having an arts lesson. The lesson is part of a collaborative project between the school and nearby university. Anne, the teacher for the lesson, is a senior lecturer in arts and crafts from the university. This time, the lesson is focusing on raising attention, awareness and sensitivity through texture. Anne starts the lesson by asking the students to explore their surroundings, to look for different textures and to depict the textures through the technique of rubbing, here by using plain paper and pencils or crayons. At first, the students seem a bit confused. They mostly stroll around the classroom, looking at different things. However, after a while, some of the students start to touch the things with their hands, and some even hold different things to their cheeks. Soon, more and more of the students are doing the same.

'Wow, look here!' one of the students calls out, 'I found a cool piece of wood here'—the student gently touches the piece—'it's really spiky and rough, but it's cool in a way. Look at the texture when I rub the crayon over the paper on top of the wood!' The student views the texture on the paper and softly strokes her hand over the sheet and notes with interest: 'What a difference it is to stroke the paper and the piece of wood … even though it actually is the same texture. Strange … I'm not sure how to say it …'.

The lesson continues, and the students concentrate on the task. After a while, another student says, 'And I found a soft and cosy ball of yarn. It feels like my jumper. I wonder if it will have any texture … let's try …'.

'You can't guess where I found a texture!' one of the students excitedly cries out. 'On my own hand! Look what happens when I place the paper on top of the knuckles of my hand and rub the pencil over it'.

Another student gently strokes his hand over the school desk and mutters quietly, 'Maybe this is a texture …'. He places the paper on the desk and starts rubbing it with a crayon. Gradually, a visual image of the texture emerges. The boy smiles and shows it to a classmate before handing it to the teacher.

The students' examinations increase in intensity, and they become more and more engaged in the task. At the end of the lesson, all the sheets of paper depicting a variety of different textures from their nearby surroundings and the students themselves are displayed on the classroom wall as collective artwork. The students and teacher discuss their experiences of the task and what came out of it. They are all happy with the task and its results.

Epilogue

A couple of weeks after the texture lesson, Anne, the teacher, bumped into one of the students—the boy who found a texture on his school desk—when she

> was shopping for food in the grocery store. As soon as the boy spotted Anne at the fruit and vegetable corner, he ran towards her and proclaimed loudly and excitedly, 'Anne, Anne, have you seen all the textures that are here in the grocery store?'

The technique of rubbing—a so-called frottage technique that they used in the arts lesson described in the narrative—is quite common in (arts) education, and by using the technique, the students depicted texture through an aesthetic form of expression. Thereby, the students were given the opportunity to increase their attention, awareness and sensitivity through texture, and as a result, they may transform their bodily and sensory experiences so that aesthetic experiences could occur (cf. Dufrenne 1973). Aesthetic experiences can enable a person to see the world and themselves in a new way—or to make one's surroundings visible again (Dufrenne 1973). It is clear that the students had not previously paid attention to the textures in their surroundings or on themselves in the same way as they did during the lesson on texture. This may, in turn, mean that 'new' ways of viewing the world draw attention to and support new experiences of value not only for education and the arts, but for life itself.

Various modes of expression, such as artwork like an image or texture, convey messages to their audiences (c.f. Merleau-Ponty 1995). However, when talking about the different art forms, Bourdieu (1993) emphasised the need to reflect on the meaning of art. This is because most art forms go beyond words. There is, however, a difference between experiencing aesthetically and shaping an aesthetic process (Cronquist 2020). In the lesson exemplified in the narrative, the students were able to shape the process. The students had the opportunity not only to experience the texture as spectators, but also to involve themselves in the world and interact with it through an exploratory approach. In connection to arts and arts education, Biesta (2018) formulated an exploratory approach as follows: 'Art itself appears as the ongoing exploration of what it means to be in the world, the ongoing attempt to figuring

out what it means to be here, now; to be—here—now' (17). This concerns whether a student acquires knowledge by viewing the world or acting in the world.

Texture, Education and the Arts in Relation to Corporality and the Senses

Humans are in a continuous dialogue with their physical and visual surroundings, and textures of different forms often evoke a desire or need to touch them. By touching textures, the person can experience and sense them with their fingers or with more tender areas of the skin, as some of the students did in the narrative above: 'I found a cool piece of wood here'—the student gently touches the piece—'it's really spiky and rough'. Textures often arouse a variety of senses, even though our sense of touch must be regarded as central to the experience of texture. Therefore, our bodies are of critical significance in all experiences and, in this case, when experiencing and exploring texture.

Learning is moulded by the experiences that people undergo as human beings in the world, and these experiences are, above all, incorporated through the body, as pointed out by Merleau-Ponty (1968, 2002). Human beings experience the world through bodily senses: looking through their eyes, listening through their ears, incorporating different experiences of taste through their mouths, experiencing smell through their noses and grasping and feeling things or other people through their hands (Alerby, 2009). Thus, it is through the body that experiences in the world arise and knowledge of a complex and inhabited world can be acquired. Therefore, a significant means of understanding the world is the body. It is also through the body that humans live in relation to other things, such as texture.

In the narrative above, it is evident that the students used their bodies when looking for and exploring different textures: 'after a while, some of the students start to

touch the things with their hands, some even hold different things to their cheeks'. By doing so, the students acquired not only more experiences of the texture and their surroundings in the school, but also of themselves. One of the students used his own body as both a subject and an object: 'Look at what happens when I place the paper on top of the knuckles of my hand and rub the pencil over it'. In this example, the knuckles became the depicted object, while the fingers on the student's other hand—the subject—held the pencil and rubbed the texture. This can be seen as a further example of the mutual interplay between the human body and the world, or as Merleau-Ponty (2002) expressed, '... the world is wholly inside me and I am wholly outside myself' (p. 408).

It is not only the experiences acquired in school that matter. Doodington (2014) emphasised that the experiences of an everyday activity, such as strolling on the grass or walking down a city street, increase a person's bodily sensibility. For example, when engaged in such activities on the way to school, a student approaches and experiences multiple textures; these experiences are of significance to tactile attention and aesthetic compliance. However, as Doodington (2014) noted, it is essential '[to] shape this sensibility through expressions that bring the experience to consciousness' (52). Therefore, it is about being aware of and attentive to the tactile and visual world—the world of texture—and using it in different (arts) educational situations to strengthen the same. One example of how this can be done is highlighted in the narrative above. Letting students acquire aesthetic experiences and including these in teaching as a form of the didactic approach may lead to developing the students' imagination, sentiment and critical thinking (cf. Dufrenne 1973). However, the point is not only to focus on how teachers can help students create personal expressions or express themselves—it is about how students should be able to engage in a dialogue with the world (Biesta 2010).

Texture and the Challenge of Senses

In accordance with the argumentation above, illuminating the degree to which the human senses communicate with each other is interesting. To exemplify the communication of the senses, a lemon can be used (cf. Alerby, 2009). If a person has touched and tasted a lemon, they have a previous experience of the texture of a lemon peel and how it tastes. The person in question does not need to touch or taste it to know that it is a lemon. Instead, previous sensory experiences of the touch and taste of a lemon communicate with the sense of sight, and the person can understand the lemon in terms of what they see—its yellow peel and sour taste. Another example of the senses in communication is manifested in the assembling of a snowball and the knowledge of how snow cools the hands and how the texture of the snow feels against the skin; this experience leads the person to see a snowball's coldness and texture. The sight gives the idea of shape, and the touch confirms the perception and gives a fuller picture of consistency, hardness, temperature, material properties and structure—that is, texture—which, in turn, is related to previous experiences.

To continue the argumentation on communication between the senses and connect the reasoning to the context of a student learning to write, a letter's sound enters the body through hearing and comes out in the tactile sense of holding a pen (Alerby, 2009). In connection with this reasoning, the product of the writing itself—the text —is also a texture (in most cases and to some extent, it also conveys a message). As Abbs (1989) expressed about languages and texts such as stories or poems, '[I]t involves a sensing of the texture of words, their individual tone, their cumulative rhythm, their imaginal energy, their multiple associations, their cluster of meanings' (67).

In addition to sensations, textures often arouse associations. They may appear attractive or repulsive, here depending on previous experiences. However, previous experiences do not always match what is experienced in the moment. In an art context,

it is not uncommon for artists to challenge previous experiences and senses that we take for granted. *Object* by Meret Oppenheim (see Figure 3) is a good example of this. It is an example of an artist using tactile texture as a central agent or means of expression.

Figure 3: 'Object, the fur-covered cup, saucer and spoon, by the artist Meret Oppenheim from 1936 at the Museum of Modern Art, New York (Rose 2015).

The work is an ordinary cup, spoon and saucer wrapped in gazelle fur, and it represents an evocative interplay between the senses. In viewing the cup, sensory experiences are probably aroused. Most likely, a clash is created between the expectations of the object's traditional function and its texture, as modified in the piece. Because of one's familiarity with this object, which are based on earlier experiences, spectators likely knew its original function—for drinking coffee or tea—but also imagine exploiting this function with the added experience of touching a gazelle's fur.

As stated above, previous experiences do not always match what is experienced at the moment, something that is also central to (arts) educational situations. The teacher may end up in a situation that challenges previous experiences so that an ordinary and common teaching situation—a situation the teacher usually takes for

granted—develops into something completely different; hence, new experiences happen. Challenging truths that are generally taken for granted may also occur in the lives of students. Students might end up in situations that test previous experiences, just as the teacher sometimes does. This is not, however, exclusive to (arts) education and school settings but something that occurs in other activities and functions—in life itself.

Another example of artwork as a challenge to the senses and truths that are taken for granted is the stage rug *Metafoil* in the Norwegian National Opera and Ballet, which was designed by the American artist Pae White (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: The stage rug Metafoil. Photo by Jens Sølvberg.

At a distance, *Metafoil* is an example of a texture that recalls crumpled aluminium foil. However, the surface of the rug is not crumpled; rather, it is totally flat. It is easy to be duped by an image or texture. Textures are not always what they seem. *Metafoil* gives the illusion of three dimensions, a relief effect, but it is nevertheless two-dimensional. In touching the rug, the sense of sight can be convinced that the surface is flat, which is a further example of communication between the senses. A similar example is shown in the narrative above, when one of the students viewed the depicted texture on her paper and softly stroked her hand over the sheet, noting, 'What a difference it

is to stroke the paper and the piece of wood … even though it actually is the same texture'. The body's tactile experiences and its memory of them hold a multitude of emotions and expectations that may, however, not be fully expressed through verbal language. Verbally reproducing the nuances of the bodily experience of touching different textures, such as *Object, Metafoil* or a texture from a piece of wood rubbed on a sheet of paper sometimes becomes too difficult. Not everything can be spoken or verbally communicated; instead, Merleau-Ponty (1995) stressed the silent and implicit language that exists in every person; he also stressed that this silent and implicit language can be manifested through visual appearances, such as various forms of art.

As has been emphasised previously in the current article, different textures are always present, which may be so obvious that they are invisible or silent, in van Manen's (1990) parlance. Indeed, nothing is as silent as that which is totally obvious. To further elaborate on reasoning concerning the unspeakable, the relationships between silence, silent spaces, texture and (arts) education, as well as the role of repetition in this context, will be illuminated and discussed.

Silence, Silent Spaces and Repetition: Essential for Texture and (Arts) Education

Given that not everything can be spoken or verbally communicated, the silent dimensions need to be acknowledged and explored. Spoken or written words alone may not be enough to represent human knowledge—something that exists beyond what is explicitly expressed (Merleau-Ponty, 1995). This is something one of the students in the narrative put words to: 'Strange … I'm not sure how to say it'. The student expressed these words when she realised the difference between the texture of the piece of wood and that depicted on the paper.

As shown in the narrative above, the students were active participants in an arts lesson, and they were encouraged to explore and illuminate their surroundings and themselves through an aesthetic form of expression using the technique of rubbing. In school contexts, however, spoken words are often highly valued, written words perhaps more so. In the context of (arts) education, one can consider whether different art forms are valued and appreciated as obvious and natural modes of expression in school. Dufrenne (1973) emphasised that the aesthetic forms of expression are about one's freedom to express oneself. Using the arts can also be a way to unveil the silent and implicit language that exists in a manner beyond what can be described (Merleau-Ponty 1995).

One way to evoke some of what lies hidden in the tacit domain of our experiences is, therefore, to use different forms of expression. Several artists have done this while working in a variety of art forms, as exemplified above by the two different artworks of Meret Oppenheim and Pae White. Another art form of interest here is literature, and in relation to stories and poems, Abbs (1989) expressed that 'to develop the aesthetic is to develop an involvement with the expressive bodily life of language as it manifests itself in literature' (67).

To connect the reasoning to texture, texts have different paces; it remains of a rhythm consisting of silent spaces in more or less regular cycles or repetitions. Repetitions in a text or speech can have the effect of silencing it; the repetition might mean that the message goes unheard. As with the sound of a dripping faucet, listeners eventually tune it out (Alerby, 2020). In texture, repetition is an essential feature; without repetition, there is no texture. Figure 5 shows an example of the repetitive nature of a specific texture.



Figure 5: An example of the repetitive nature of a texture.
Photo by Kari Doseth Opstad.

Repetition is common and of significance not only in texture, but in education as well. In school, repetition is something that both teachers and students are familiar with in connection to situations when the student is striving to learn something and in the form of the teacher repeating instructions or a request. The teacher who repeats a request over and over again (e.g., 'Please, be quiet') to a group of unruly and chatty students who do not 'hear' or obey the teacher's words might end up finding the teacher's words being repeated into silence (Alerby, 2020). Additionally, it can be noted that the entire world of school is a repetition. Students' (and teachers') lives in school are controlled by the calendar and schedule, with both linear and circular repetition. Both the calendar and school schedule prove to have repetition in their constitution—day by day, week by week, semester by semester, year by year. Given this, the regular cycles and repetitions—the rhythm and pace—of a school can be viewed as its texture.

Like repetition, silence is an obvious and necessary part of texture, and the same holds true for words. Without silent spaces between words, communication would hardly work, and this applies to both spoken and written words. Therefore, silence is

as important as words (Merleau-Ponty 1995; Merleau-Ponty and Lefort 1968). Indeed, the text as a whole—its words and its silences—conveys a certain message that produces different understandings, here depending on its texture, among other things. As mentioned previously, in connection with the work of Abbs (1989), a text means a sense of the word's texture. Additionally, we can again stress that text and texture have the same linguistic origin and are closely linked from that perspective. One could also argue that a word or part of a texture needs to be in solitude, though it is often interpreted in conjunction with other words or, in the case of a texture, with other elements. To illustrate, this paragraph has been reproduced below without any space between the words (cf. Alerby, 2020).

> Additionally,wecanagainstressthattextandtexturehavethesamelinguisticorigin-andareandarecloselylinkedfromthatperspective.Onecouldalsoarguethataword,o rpartofatexture,needstobeinsolitude,thoughitisofteninterpretedinconjunction-withotherwords,orinthecaseofatexture,withotherelements.Toillustrate,this-paragraphhasbeenreproducedbelowwithoutanyspacesbetweenthewords.

This is an example of the importance of silent spaces between words. Without silence between the words, whether the words are spoken or written, communication would not function. By omitting the silent spaces between words, a completely different texture arises, and a completely different understanding of the text occurs. The same is true for other forms of texture: without the silent or empty spaces in a texture, there is no texture. Silent spaces are, therefore, important components in both texts and textures. It is the silent and solitary spaces in between that make the difference and create the text or texture (see Figure 6).



Figure 6: An example of silent and solitude spaces in a texture. Photo by Kari Doseth Opstad.

The silent spaces in between in textures can also be viewed as the cracks that unleash dissimilarities and disparities and, in doing so, enable something new or something different and contrasting. As Leonard Cohen (1992) sang in 'Anthem', 'There is a crack, a crack in everything. That's how the light gets in'.

Some Final Words: Texture and (Arts) Education as an Intertwined Relationship

In the current article, the complexities of the concept of texture in relation to (arts) education have been elaborated upon, and we have, for example, stated that texture comprises a variety of different aspects, dimensions and characteristics. Texture occurs in a multitude of different shapes and guises, but it is essential to note that a texture often evokes associations and challenges the senses, that the body is of significance when exploring a texture and that an essential issue for both texture and education is silence and repetition.

In the current article, our intention has been to illuminate, elaborate on and explore the complexities of the concept of texture and its relationship to (arts) education, a relationship that can be described as intertwined. Our sincere hope is that the readers of this paper will embrace openness and open-ended curiosity and continue to consider what may happen if different aesthetic experiences, dimensions and concepts are used in genuine and concrete ways throughout society, and, more specifically, in different (arts) educational contexts and settings (i.e., in the classroom). When using the concept of texture and working with it in a tangible way in the classroom with students, attention, awareness and sensitivity might increase. Examples of this have been presented in the narrative and discussed throughout the text.

Aesthetic dimensions such as texture play an essential role in (arts) education (Lewis 2009), but one must be attentive and responsive to them, which first requires having awareness of and valuing bodily and sensory experiences (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1968, 2002). Abbs (1989) argued that humans are aesthetic beings long before they become rational beings. However, the aesthetic dimensions of human life might be unsubtle and undeveloped during one's lifespan. To prevent this, schools play a crucial role with their educational activities. Dufrenne (1973) went as far as to claim that aesthetic experiences help a person make the world visible and view it from new perspectives. This may mean that the things that the individual has not previously paid attention to are brought to the foreground, which is exemplified through the boy in the narrative meeting his teacher in the grocery store and drawing her attention to all the textures there: 'Anne, Anne, have you seen all the textures that are here in the grocery store?' This is an example of how the boy's experiences from the texture lesson enabled him to view the world in the grocery store in a new way. The boy's attention, awareness and sensitivity had likely increased at a more general level in relation to texture. Or as Dufrenne (1973) expressed, it is a kind of emotional response that makes the surroundings visible for the individual. In this example, the boy's sur-

roundings—the grocery store—was filled with textures, and this became visible to him.

According to Abbs (1989), in the same way that language or a text has a texture, the different activities and interpersonal relationships in the classroom have a texture. In all activities and relationships, irrespective of whether they embrace silence, repetition and solitude or not, the humans in the space—teachers and students—collectively shape the texture of the situation. The texture of such a situation is, however, constantly changing and is volatile by nature in contrast to the texture of physical and persisting things, such as a piece of wood, a ball of yarn or a school desk. The material world is important, and without attention, awareness and sensitivity to these issues, both individuals and society might be diminished.

In conclusion, we suggest that (arts) education is or should take the mode of an open-ended and unpredictable transformation, supporting critical and novel considerations of the same. Through the lens of texture, different and more or less obvious aesthetic dimensions might be valued and appreciated. Indeed, the notion of texture and its immediacy within bodily and sensory experiences is of significance for (arts) education, as has been argued throughout the present article. There is a challenge inherent in bodily conceived engagement in an environment entirely entangled with textures, and various forms of texture may sensitise humans to develop the habits to generate growth and a desire for sensory experience. All these aspects are fundamental and essential for education and training, teaching and schooling, formation and transformation—that is, for classroom activities. We argue that texture encourages or brings out the attention, awareness and sensitivity that are of significance not only for (arts) education, but also for the formation of society—for the formation of our lives.

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About the Author

Eva Alerby is a Professor of Education and holds a chair at the Department of Health, Education and Technology, Luleå University of Technology, Sweden. She is also a Visiting Professor at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. Her research interests are relations, identity and diversity in education, as well as philosophical and existential dimensions of education, such as corporality and embodied knowledge, place and space, time and temporality, silence and tacit knowledge. Her most recent book is S*ilence Within and Beyond Pedagogical Settings* (2020). Alerby is currently scientific leader for the project *Mind the Body: Renegotiating educational concepts and practices in digitalised teacher education*, funded by the Swedish Research Council.

Kari Doseth Opstad is an Associate Professor at Department of Education, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, where she is teaching Arts and Crafts at the teacher education programs. Her research interest is linked to the importance of arts and crafts throughout the school system. Texture has been a common interest and of significance for her, both as an aesthetic tool and as a starting point for her teaching in Arts and Craft – from preschool children to teacher students. Her interest in the phenomenon of texture goes as far back as her master thesis *Textures in weaving* (1990). She has also presented paper at conferences, published in Norwegian professional journals, and have had workshops on the topic of texture for various target groups.

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Emotions in music education as an ethical issue

Theocharis Raptis

University of Ioannina, Greece

Abstract

This paper can be understood as the result of philosophical reflection on a music educational project that has already taken place. The main aim of the project was the strengthening of the emotional competence of the students. Although the developments in psychology show crucial mechanisms with which music induces emotions, several new questions emerge that shift the discussion in the field of philosophy: how should we as teachers encounter emotions in the classroom and especially in the music classroom? What should educators try to achieve and what is allowed? How should our emotions and students' emotions be handled? It is obvious, that these questions require answers mainly in the field of practical philosophy as well as ethics and politics. The philosophical work of Martha Nussbaum can be used as an appropriate basis with which to discuss and to answer some of these questions. The way Nussbaum considers emotions can help us to understand and also to re-design the project as the place of the free experiencing of emotions and of reflecting on and discussing emotions. Nussbaum's thoughts, as a philosophical framing of our project, build the basis on which to combine emotions and ethics in the classroom and offer an area for an open dialogue about our questions. This dialogue can help us to think and to justify our decisions or to find new ways for a music education that embraces the emotions in the classroom and strengthens the emotional competence of students and teachers.

Keywords: *Music end emotions, emotional competence, Martha Nussbaum, emotions and ethics, music education in kindergarten*

Emotions in music education as an ethical issue

Theocharis Raptis[1]

Introduction

There is a wide held belief that music is closely related to emotions and perhaps this relation is the most crucial reason for people's fascination with music. In the Department for Early Childhood Education, at the University of Ioannina (Greece), we decided to design and implement a music educational project with kindergarten students. Our main aim was to focus on children's emotional reactions to music. Researching the literature, it was evident that the main interest of the philosophical discussions in the area of music education concerns the possible relations between music and emotions. There is a long philosophical tradition regarding this relationship which, over the last decades, has also dominated modern philosophical discussions about emotions in music education. These contemporary discussions were introduced by Bennett Reimer (1970; 1989; 2003) with the "music education as aesthetic education" paradigm and based on the theoretical framework of Susanne Langer (1979) and Leonard Meyer (1956).

Over the last twenty years there has been a growing body of research with key results and developments in the field of psychology, which highlight the many and various ways in which music can be related to emotions. Juslin (2019) even suggests that "psychology has made more progress in explaining how music arouses emotions in

1 Raptis, Theocharis: University of Ioannina, Greece: chraptis@uoi.gr

the last 20 years, than what philosophy has in the past 2000 years» (34). Because of these developments, it can be stated that we have found out many crucial mechanisms and processes to understand how music can influence people's emotional world. However, I suggest that another main field should be introduced into the philosophical discussion about music and emotions in a music educational framework. I return to the first steps of the philosophy of music education as a new field in music education, where Broudy writes: "to describe the role of musical experience is, in part at least, a problem in aesthetics; to define the role of musical experience in life as a whole is a problem of *ethics* and *value theory* [...]" (Broudy, 1958, 63). In this paper our effort is also to combine music education with ethics.

This raises two main questions; Firstly, how should we as teachers encounter emotions in the classroom and especially in the music classroom and how should these emotions be handled? Secondly, what should educators try to achieve and what is allowed? It is obvious, that these questions require answers mainly in the field of practical philosophy, also ethics and politics. While psychology or aesthetics can contribute to a better understanding of how music induces or represents emotions in a music educational framework, they do not say so much about the main aims and purposes in this framework. However, the outcomes from the research and discussion in fields like psychology or aesthetics partially, albeit crucially, influence answers in this alternative way of seeing the relations between music, emotions and education.

In this paper I will briefly draw on the latest research developments in psychology about the mechanisms for the induction of emotions by music and will consider the term "emotional competence", particularly in relation to the more renowned term "emotional intelligence". Thereafter, in the main part of this paper, I will show the necessity of a critical, philosophical framing of a music educational project for the strengthening of the emotional competence of kindergarten students, especially in relation to the core question: how should we handle our emotions and children's emo-

tions in the classroom? Philosophy in music education could be the place for reflection and critical thinking about our educational practices. This paper will show how there was a need after our music educational project was implemented to reframe philosophical discussions and that further exploration and discussion should be a primary part of a philosophical dialogue about ethics and politics. The philosophical work of Martha Nussbaum will be drawn on in order to seek some answers or indeed to formulate new questions.

Music and emotions/emotional competence in the classroom

There is a long philosophical tradition, which refers to the relationship between music and emotions. In the framework of this tradition, music has been understood as mimesis of emotions (from Ancient Greece until the theory of "Affektenlehre") or as a symbol of emotions (Cook & Dibben, 2010; Langer, 1979; Hunter & Schellenberg, 2010). In the past years research in the psychology of music makes a crucial distinction between perception and the experiencing of emotions. By listening to music, someone may perceive and recognize an emotion expressed in the music, or music may induce emotions in her/him (Gabrielsson, 2002; Juslin & Sloboda, 2013; Juslin, 2016).

In relation to the musical expression of emotions, the discussion included the question of which emotions express the music and how that was possible (Juslin & Sloboda, 2013; Juslin & Lindström, 2016). In the exploration of musical features the research distinguished between composer-related features and performer-related features (Juslin & Sloboda, 2013). In the field of arousal or induction of emotions, many researchers mentioned the importance of individual or situational factors. Our project's proposal was focused and based on mechanisms, which elucidated the induction of emotions and resulted within the "BRECVEMA framework" (Juslin et

al., 2010; Juslin, 2016; Juslin & Lindström, 2016). According to this, the mechanisms that contributed to the experience of emotions from music are related to the brain stem reflex, rhythmic entrainment, evaluative conditioning, emotional contagion, visual imagery, episodic memory, musical expectancy, and aesthetic judgment. This framework is a complex process involving psychological, physiological, sociological, and personal factors. Elliott and Silverman (2012) added visual-musical interactions, corporeality, musical personas, and social attachments. By experiencing emotions due to musical activities, several of these mechanisms may be active simultaneously but in every case not all of these mechanisms and not at the same level. It should also be understood that every music-emotional episode is the result of a combination of mechanisms in this particular situation (Raptis, 2020). It is important to underline, that in the "BRECVEMA framework" aesthetic judgement is the last additional mechanism. It is, however, essential for music educators because it allows for the avoidance of the total ignorance associated with the tradition of the "music education as aesthetic education" paradigm over recent years. Juslin (2016) includes in his mechanisms aesthetic judgement, "a process whereby an emotion is evoked in the listener because of his or her evaluation of the music's aesthetic value" (205). In this process the listener filters through subjective criteria perceptual, cognitive and emotional inputs, the outcomes of which can be widely positive (liking) or negative (disliking). These outcomes can likewise arouse additional emotions. Juslin's mechanism combines "aesthetic" in its first meaning (mainly perceptual, sensual) with the established conception of aesthetic(s), which concerns beauty and taste.

Generally, in the discussion about emotions over recent decades, the most recognized term is that of "emotional intelligence" which especially gained popularity with the publication of the book Emotional Intelligence. Why can it matter more than IQ by Daniel Goleman in 1995 (Parker et al., 2009). This term is nowadays primarily to be found in texts about management, team leading or marketing. In an educational context emotional intelligence is very often presented as the tool to

improve the academic efficiency and productivity in school and to enhance the social relations in the classroom. In our project we preferred the term "emotional competence" instead of "emotional intelligence" because the first term indicates something which is not fixed and firm and instead something which is much more fluid and as such can be partly changed, strengthened, and learned and because of these characteristics, it can be used more flexibly in an educational setting. Emotional Intelligence, despite the claims of Goleman, seems to be understood as something akin to IQ, something that is given and can be also measured by tests (Boler, 1999).

In a music educational framework, music educational activities could be designed and implemented with the aim of strengthening emotional competence. In the last three summer-semesters in the Department for Early Childhood Education at the University of Ioannina, a project was designed and implemented with kindergarten students. In this project we tried to find different ways to arouse and affect the emotions by means of music and to help the children to recognize emotions in themselves and in others, to manage emotional situations and to improve the relations with others. The musical activities were matched to the age of the students as layed out in the following:

- Singing
- Free or synchronized movement; moving and dancing to music;
- Playing musical instruments;
- Listening to music or sounds;
- Listening to live performance of musical instruments;
- Listening to the narration of a story with the accompaniment of musical elements;
- Playing theater fragments with the accompaniment of musical elements;
- Drawing to music;

- Discussing the present emotions during the sessions of the program, or past emotions.

According to our definition of emotional competence, the aims of the project were (a) to strengthen the awareness of one's own emotions(b) to regulate these emotions (c) to strengthen the awareness of the emotions of others and (d) to regulate the behavior and to improve relationships with others. The variety of the musical actions in this project corresponds to the variety of the mechanisms which induce emotions by music. The results of this project are not presented in this paper.[2]

The philosophical framing: emotions as Upheavals of Thought

We understand philosophical inquiry in an educational frame inter alia as a process of reflection and critical review of our practice. This process leads to the problematization of several situations and to, in many cases, the questioning about several formulations which seemed unable to remain without further justification. Furthermore, it was apparent that a deeper survey, especially in a social and ethical perspective, was required. For example, what does it mean in a pedagogical framework to regulate the emotions and behavior, to manage the emotional experiences in ways that society expects and accepts? In the small "society" of the classroom to manage anger, for instance, is usually understood as the ability to avoid aggression and violence. But, if something seems to be wrong in the classroom, or if a student feels wronged and oppressed, we would argue that she/he must express these feelings. In this way, she/he can help the other students and the teacher to understand her/him and, consequently, to be more careful and to avoid certain behaviors. Often in the classroom

2 The description and the results of the implementation of the project in the first year 2016-17 can be found in Raptis, 2020. In Summer Semester 2019-20 the Implementation was interrupted because of the measures for Covid19.

some clichés about emotional behaviors are accepted uncritically and as such run the risk of establishing a form of emotional conformity. These cliches are the appearances of deeper attitudes and beliefs and they can often disclose the political dimension in the managing of emotions in the classroom, because "power is located in emotional expression (Campbell, 1997)—in who gets to express and who must repress various emotions" (Zembylas, 2007: 293). The understanding of emotions in the classroom presupposes "the analysis that challenges the cultural and historical emotion norms with respect to what emotions are, how they are expressed, who gets to express them and under what circumstances." (Zembylas, 2007: 294). For example, we could ask: is children's anger in the classroom expected and accepted always in the same way, regardless of gender, race or social status? (Boler, 1999).

A philosophical approach seems to be required in order to discuss this kind of questions. As has been mentioned, Juslin (2019) argues that psychology has contributed much more to the understanding of how music induces emotions than philosophy over the many years in which it has been discussed. Nevertheless, the understanding of the many ways music induces emotions is not sufficient enough to give answers about the functions, the aims and the dangers of trying to handle emotions in an educational setting.

There are many theoretical suggestions and a long tradition of discussion about emotions in the field of philosophy. Robert Solomon mentions that in this long tradition there are two features that have determined the philosophical view of emotions for many years: (a) the inferior role of emotion, the suggestion that emotions are something "primitive, less intelligent, more bestial, less dependable, and more dangerous than reason"; (b) the reason-emotion distinction, as two different natural kinds, "two conflicting and antagonistic aspects of the soul" (Solomon, 2004: 3). Solomon argues that the interest of philosophy usually focuses on the more cognitive aspects of emotions. At the same time, the physiological and to a certain extent the

social and behavioral dimensions of emotions are diminished (Solomon, 2004: 4). As has been seen, in the brief presentation above, the whole process of inducing emotions by music is based on a variety of mechanisms. The cognitive aspect seems to be a significant constituent in the formation of emotions, but it is not unique. Music seems to be the domain in which the combination of physiological, psychological, cognitive, social and autobiographical elements form a complex mechanism of inducing emotions. It could also be suggested that music in an educational context, could contribute to the understanding of the many ways in which emotions are induced and, in this way, help us to be more aware about our emotions and the emotions of others. According to this we could more consciously find our personal ways to manage our emotions and to behave in a social context and in particular situations while, considering at the same time the social environment and others. Solomon focuses on the cognitive elements of the emotions and includes them in the philosophical terrain. That is the reason that emotions "can be evaluated in terms of the same epistemic and ethical criteria that we use to evaluate beliefs and intentions: Are they appropriate to the context?" According to this, the emotions "cannot be understood without grasping their reasons, and these reasons in turn give us a basis for evaluation" (Solomon, 2004: 13).

If the new results of the psychological research and the philosophical view of emotions and music are taken into account, then reason and emotions should not be considered as absolutely different natural things and as such it ought to be assumed that there is not an absolute dichotomy between these two domains. This fluidity between what have, until recently, been perceived as distinct spheres forms a fundamental basis for the philosophical framing of our music educational project. Philosophical texts can contribute to the use of the cognitive aspects of emotions without excluding the physiological or behavioral aspects, in relation to emotional competence. In the challenge to achieve the appropriate balance, I would like to present some possible approaches by drawing on the work of Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum

(a) considers the emotions, their relation to reason and their contribution to ethical life as something central in her philosophy, (b) highlights the importance of arts and inter alia of music in human life and (c) investigates the educational facets of the emotions and art.

Nussbaum's philosophy focuses on the emotions and one of her most influential books in this field is the *Upheavals of Thought* (2001). Even the title indicates the relationship between emotions and thought and that is the main reason why emotions have an enormous contribution to our ethical life. The term "upheaval" in the title highlights the experiential nature of cognition, the understanding of emotions as a very intense way of knowing. Nussbaum describes the grief she felt over the death of her mother: "[...] the real, full recognition of that terrible event (as many times as I recognize it) *is* the upheaval" (45). Nussbaum uses the description of Proust's Charlus to speak about the landscape of emotions, "a landscape full of mountains and valleys, produced as if by 'geological upheavels of thought'" (88). The new world with the deep emotions is "a more agitated world, alive as it is at every moment to small movements of thought and action in a person whom he in no way controls [...] "(88).

The cognitive dimension of emotions consists in the fact that they usually have objects and "they tend to be about people, things, or circumstances that a person considers to have some bearing on his or her own happiness or well-being" (Cates, 2003: 326). This cognitive dimension is founded on three main ideas: "the idea of a *cognitive appraisal* or *evaluation*; the idea of *one's own flourishing* or *one's important goals and projects*; and *the idea of the salience of external objects as elements in one's own scheme of goals.*" (Nussbaum, 2001: 4, italics in original). It is important to elucidate, that with the term "cognitive" Nussbaum doesn't mean "the presence of elaborate calculation, of computation, or even of reflexive self-awareness." (23). She considers this cognitive nature of emotions much more as a simple form of awareness, "concerned with receiving and processing information", which can also be

found also in infants or animals (23). The chapter "*Music and emotions*" (249-294) should be understood as a part of Nussbaum's intention to expand the cognitive definition of emotions, because emotions seem not to be restricted by the limits of the language; the aesthetic experiences can be experienced as emotions, or they can induce emotions. Nussbaum also tries to say that we should not understand judgment in emotions only as linguistic cognition but as "both capable of processing propositional (linguistic) and non-propositional information" (Adomaityte, 2015: 80). "Language [...] is not everything in emotion" (Nussbaum, 2001: 149). This argument is used by Nussbaum to include animals and human infants into her account as beings capable of genuine emotions. It also enables her to postulate that aesthetic experiences, such as dance and music, are able to give non-propositional attitudes that can be received by our emotions (Adomaityte, 2015). Furthermore, emotions should be understood as a procedure of integrating and working with the data that the body brings to us and that this bodily dimension extends the term "cognitive", in relation to emotions. This is important to mention when discussing music education, because the emotions induced by music often have a strong bodily basis.

One central question in Nussbaum's consideration of emotions is if emotions necessarily contain non-cognitive elements. She claims that it is difficult to answer if some elements like bodily reactions and feelings are necessary constitutive elements of an emotion like, for example, grief; she suggests that the answer should be negative (57). Grief, for instance, is much more the reaction to the recognition of the importance on something that we have lost. She maintains that judgment is a constituent part of emotion and a sufficient cause for its other elements, but other elements like feelings or bodily movements are parts of the judgment itself. (Nussbaum, 2001). This statement is deeply connected with how she construes judgment (Adomaityte, 2015).

The most crucial point in Nussbaum's exploration of emotions is the way she relates it to our ethical life. Emotions have always had to do with the value of external objects, but they are not necessarily outside the human body, but rather things outside a person's complete control. This means that emotions record "that sense of vulnerability and imperfect control." (Nussbaum, 2001: 43). Nussbaum argues that emotions indicate our neediness, and our lack of control. "The emotions, according to this, disclose our own vulnerability by highlighting something very true of human life itself. This is a great achievement for emotional knowledge which offers a unique perspective to ethical thought." (Adomaityte, 2015: 301). Vulnerability can be the basis with which to approach otherness, to be aware about the neediness of the other. This point in the discussion about the emotions leads from "me" to "us" and to the field of ethics.

The emotions have a central place in the ethical view of Nussbaum because her ethical theory is based on humans' lives and the emotions are essential elements for these lives. For Nussbaum it is not only important that someone makes the right choices, but also that these choices are accompanied by the appropriate emotions. According to this, the emotions have an ethical dimension, they can contribute to answer the question "'What is worth caring about?' 'How should I live?'" (Nussbaum, 2001: 149) and they can help to implement this answer in real life. Acting virtuously describes not only the correct actions, but "doing so with the appropriate thoughts, motives and reactive feelings." (Adomaityte, 2015: 304). Furthermore, emotions seem to be a form of deep connection with the world and with everything that happens around us.

Because of its nature, music can in many ways evoke emotions. In our project we tried to highlight, in many of our activities, the cognitive elements of the emotions. At the same time, music evoked stark bodily feelings and we have tried to combine them with some lines of thought. We tried to help children to experience strong emo-

tions and feelings and to understand the causes of these and the processes that induce or change emotions. In combination with narration, theater or lyrics of a song, the emotional changes were related to a sequence of events in time. We also created a "safe" environment, in which the children could experience several emotions and had the opportunity to reflect upon them, with our help, their nature and causes, without real threat or fear because of the reactions which some of them may provoke.

In this project, there is the risk of modifying the process of understanding and handling the emotions to a form of emotional manipulation of the children by the teacher. Because of this, our effort is to use emotions to build a basis for dialogue, for a process of being aware about our emotions and of understanding the emotions of others, a process of evaluating what is important and of choosing between different situations and the corresponding emotions. That does not mean that emotions are reduced to an intellectual process and that in emotions there is no place for non-cognitive elements, or that these non-cognitive elements are not crucial for an emotional experience. The main point in our music educational project is that the deep experiences that the children can have with the contribution of music can be the basis on which to reflect upon their emotional lives. This way of reflection in not abstract and distanced, but bodily and experiential, with all the myriad of ways with which the emotions enrich the world of reason. These emotions, induced by music, can be combined with the concreteness of a story or of a narration in a general sense. At the same time bodily reactions to music or music producing with the voice or with musical instruments can help children to experience emotions and to feel the intensity of this experience. Children can also be helped to become aware of their emotional changes, to understand how and why they can have several emotional experiences and what meaning and importance the realization of these experiences has on their lives.

Nussbaum maintains in her book "Not for the profit" (2010) the significance of play and of arts in human life and in education. She argues that storytelling and nar-

rative play become important aspects of cultivating a child's imagination, as the children can learn to imagine the experiences of others. Playing creates a safe space in which the children can experiment with their relations towards others without the fear of being injured, because all these relations and feelings remain in this playing field. Children enjoy being placed in this form of safe risk and they can follow and participate in human relations and in the succession of emotions. Playing and storytelling help the children to imagine the pain of others, to have the interest to learn about the life of others, to find out the ways people manage these relations, and finally it strengthens the child's ability "to see other people in non-instrumental and even non-eudaimonistic ways, as objects of wonder in their own right." (Nussbaum, 2001: 237). According to Winnicott, play is the activity that takes place in the space between people and this place is called "'potential space'. Here people (children first, adults later) experiment with the idea of otherness in ways that are less threatening than the direct encounter with another may often be" (Nussbaum, 2010: 99). In play the presence of the other becomes "a delightful source of curiosity" (100). The arts undertaken by adults perform the function of play and can prepare people for friendship and for their political and ethical life. Nussbaum argues that this capacity of wonder in simple nursery rhymes can send children to the place of others, e.g., a child, a small animal, even an inanimate object (Nussbaum, 2010: 99). This is precisely the aim of healthy development – enabling the same wonder but about other people.

What Nussbaum, following Winnicott, suggests is that the potential space of play does not disappear just because one becomes an adult – children's play re-emerges in adult life through the medium of the arts. Winnicott argued that one of the key functions of arts in every society and culture is "to preserve and enhance the cultivation of the 'play space', and he saw the role of the arts in human life as, above all, that of "nourishing and extending the capacity for empathy" (Nussbaum, 2010: 101). Also play and arts are the means with which humans enhance their abilities to

understand others, to strengthen empathy and imagination to understand others and to understand and to handle our relations, not as an art of manipulation, but as an effort to be in a deep relation with others.

Discussion: Philosophical reframing of emotions in music education

If arts as the "playing space" for adults is taken into consideration, then it can be understood that our music educational project combines play with music and other forms of arts in a way that can be crucial for the present and for the future of the children. The whole project was designed as a playful journey and the children had the chance to think about what happened, about the emotions of the other children and of the heroes of the stories, and, at the same time, they felt deep emotions, in many cases induced by the music or by the music in a combination with several forms of narration. In this project music and play afford the means to create the "potential place", also the place to think about and to experience emotions in safety.

According to Nussbaum's consideration of emotions as judgements, I think that we should understand our project for strengthen the emotional competence of the students as the emergence of an experiencing- and dialogue-place for the children, a place to discuss about their experiences, to understand what happens to them and why, to be aware about the influence of their actions on other people. The aim is not to reduce emotional competence to a permanent discussion with rational arguments. Music can build a space suitable for deep experiences, combined with bodily reactions and tendency towards action. It should not be forgotten the upheaval-character of the emotions, which urge us to think and to act in a deeper, experiential art and to share our thoughts about feelings with others. Emotions build the basis for communication, not only as a topic to discuss, but much more as the cause and the motive for communication. At the same time, this occurs in a safe, delightful and pleasant

setting, so that the children feel free to touch on “difficult” emotions, like fear or sadness.

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Nussbaum highlights the cognitive nature of emotions but seems to underestimate their non cognitive dimension. It should be noted that most examples under consideration in Nussbaum’s work concern complex emotions. It would also be helpful in our study to distinguish between simple and complex emotions (Adomaityte, 2015). We have tried in our project to handle some simple and basic emotions with music. At the same time, however, the narration and the context of the music contributed to reflections about these emotions and in many cases combined simple emotions with some more complex ones.

One of the most important premises that should be understood about this project is that emotions in society and especially in education are a place for social control. Education is a place in which beliefs and values are shaped. This reality is diffi-

cult to be realized because of the ostracism of emotions or the subjection to the superiority of reason in education or because of the power of habit. We should also try in our educational project to disclose the ways that our emotions are imposed on the educational framework according to gender, race, social status etc. The project should help teachers and students to dispute the nature and the causes of emotions. Much more, they should not only understand why we have an emotion or why we consider an emotion as appropriate in a situation, but also what are the social mechanisms and presuppositions that cause these emotions and define what is appropriate in a specific situation. Of course, every educational project should fit the age of the students. The aim of our project is that the young children experience and recognize their emotions and, at the same time, react musically or, were able to discuss certain emotional situations, in a way appropriate to their age.

At the same time the whole project could help teachers to understand that the emotions should be brought out of the private and into the public sphere (Boler, 1999). The emotions should also be approached out of the binary "private – public" and the teachers should be able to recognize the mechanisms which are used for the control of the emotions in education, for example "explicit rules of morality and explicit values of utility" and measurable skills (Boler, 1999, xix). Under this supposition they could find ways to make some rifts in these mechanisms and thoughts. The emotions themselves give the power and the means to achieve these rifts.

The emotions are crucial for children's lives and for their ethical development. Educating emotions should not be about manipulating the emotions, but the process of helping students to understand which emotions are appropriate for them in certain situations. They need to understand how other people feel and how they should react in relation to these feelings and emotions. The children themselves should learn to be critical about the emotional code of their social environment and about what is expected or accepted in a given social context. We should not impose which is the

right behavior, but room and means should be given in order children to decide about their behavior. They should also build the fundamentals with which to understand over the following years the social mechanisms that determine this code and the power-relations that are incorporated in them. At least children need to have more self confidence and trust in their emotions. They need to realize that emotions are not false or wrong but say something very true and crucial about their lives and that even negative emotions can be helpful. There are numerous emotional reactions and the children have to take into account their personal biography in their emotional lives, the uniqueness of every situation, their relations with others, with the human and the non-human environment and the social context with its power and relations.

Final remarks

Nussbaum's theory can be the appropriate basis on which to reflect on and to design, for the future, a music educational project which strengthens emotional competence and highlights its ethical dimensions. Taking this into consideration, there are at least two ways to point out these dimensions:

a. The way Nussbaum considers emotions can help us to understand and, as the next step, to redesign the project as the place of the free experiencing of emotions and of reflecting on and discussing emotions. These experiences should be understood as a tool for communication, combined with the awareness of a sense of vulnerability, that is, the deep emotional perception that we cannot always have control of our lives and that we need others. This awareness of the neediness of others builds the basis for our communication and for our ethical lives. Emotions offer the necessary impulses to sometimes forget "I" and to seek "we". Music forms the field for the emergence of the emotional sense of belonging and of the need to communicate with others. In this way, emotional life, even with some facets that we would hope to

control, but have not managed to, is a source which makes our lives worth living.

b. Music conveys in all its forms nature and culture, biological and physical characteristics with personal biography and collective experiences and, at the same time, it considers the human being as a psychosomatic whole. Emotions also have a physiological, a biographical and a socio-historical basis. This correspondence between music and emotions makes music education the appropriate field in which children and teachers can experience, express, recognize and handle emotions. In our project we combine in music education the strength and deepness of emotions, which are bodily and seem often to be absolutely personal, with the socio-historical parameters. Consequently, we can learn that the emotions are not indisputable and not without any other possibility to be otherwise. In music education ways can be found to realize the contingency of the emotions and their direct relation to the social and historical context. The awareness about the socio-historical parameters shifts the reflection in the field of the possibilities to-be-other, in the field of choices, of freedom and of multiple routes; in other words, in the field of ethics. Music education in this way underlines the ethical nature of emotions.

Nussbaum's thoughts, as a philosophical framing of our project, builds the basis to combine emotions and ethics in the classroom and affords teaching professionals an area for an open dialogue about some very crucial questions. Given that emotions are the quintessence of the musical activities of many people, this dialogue can help us to think and to justify our decisions or to find new ways for a deeper and – perhaps – more emotional music educational praxis.

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About the Author

Theocharis Raptis, PhD, is Associate Professor at the University of Ioannina (Department of Early Childhood). He studied philosophy, pedagogy and psychology at the University of Ioannina and music pedagogy, philosophy and musicology at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich. After his Magister (MA) at the Institute of Musical Pedagogy (LMU), he received his PhD. During his studies he was funded by „The Panayotis & Effie Michelis Foundation" in Athens. His special interests include music education in early childhood, philosophy of music education, systematic music education and music education and the emotions. His work has been published in international and Greek journals and books. He is Co-Editor of the Greek Journal "Musical Pedagogics".

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Rethinking Music Practise-Sessions beyond *Poiesis* and *Praxis* - *Towards Practising Democracy*

Robin Rolfhamre & Inga Marie Nesmann-Aas

University of Agder

Abstract

How can the (seemingly isolated) process of practising a musical instrument in the context of practice sessions be seen as enabling students to develop skills "that are needed to keep democracies alive' (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 2). How can we encourage this further? The approach is to explore the various potentials of the practise session to be something more than mere training. An exploration that can be instrumentally fostered in a study environment (formal or informal) through a practical pedagogical approach, not to reach a specific end — i.e. defined learning outcomes — but to result in the student transcending the professional competence acquisition situation to gain wisdom for a broader perspective. What is more, in the present article we will focus on the more autonomous aspects of the every-day, informal practice session of developing musicians and bring in perspectives from philosophy, particularly focusing on the relation between state policies and the individual performer. First, we explore the practise session-case as an aesthetic event. Secondly, we address the individual within the situation in relation to the exterior world while proposing an approach to serve as a framework for further exploration. We apply interaction through social media as a case for this section of the article. Thirdly, we seek to further develop the practice-session as a potential activity for personal growth. Next, we make a note of the related context of ensemble practice. Finally, we propose a logbook exercise to strategically enable this growth-process in practice.

Keywords: *music performance, practising, learning, phronesis, pedagogy*

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Towards Practising Democracy

Robin Rolfhamre & Inga Marie Nesmann-Aas[1]

Introduction

Becoming a professional performing musician is a painstaking and enduring process. When we are sitting in a small room, pursuing our daily practising-sessions (i.e., the time spent alone practising an instrument to improve one's skill) we often focus on scales, technique, learning a piece of music, adjusting our tone-production, getting inspiration from listening to other performances of the same work, etc. This may be a process of habit, habituation, naturalisation and mechanical and mental accommodation. But, to paraphrase Seneca, we need time alone to nurture and develop our virtues without being misdirected and disrupted by all the various impulses that demand

1 Robin Rolfhamre: University of Agder, Norway: robin.rolfhamre@uia.no
Inga Marie Nesmann-Aas: University of Agder, Norway: inga.m.nesmann-aas@uia.no

attention (Seneca, 1917, p. 5). In this paper, we pursue a philosophical approach ultimately leading us to take an existing practical pedagogical activity using a logbook exercise to enable more reflective higher education student work between performance classes, to propose a continuation and development of it through a supplementary logbook exercise to further explore additional activities promoting philosophical perspectives to ascend the cognitive levels of *poeisis* and *praxis*. This practice can be seen as both (a) philosophical perspectives as means for analysis (an act performed by the researcher(s)) and (b) philosophical inquiry as a part of a learning process (an act performed by the student). We do this on the basis of the assumption that the practice sessions occurring between main instrument performance classes have potential to be more than mechanical and artistic practising to be a reflective space in which we can aspire to grow as individuals and which can stimulate life-long learning. In the present context, we identify this potential at a practical level within a sort of instrumental constructive alignment approach (Biggs, 2020). In this perspective, the starting point is some conception or even defined expectation of what should be as a result of the practice. This can be the conception of the individual teacher or the student. Or as defined by state regulations, for instance. The teacher then uses relevant pedagogical activities to 'transport' the student from where they are at the present to that ideal.

Our understanding of Biggs' *constructive alignment* is open-ended. That is, rather than transporting the student from A to a predefined subject related B, we seek to align a pedagogical practice from A to x — instrumental for the unexplored. Although such an inquiry cannot through its implementation distance itself from some sort of political and ideological ideal, our interest and emphasis rest with the pedagogical activity rather than with a preferable conception of ulti-

mate political and ideological demarcation. As such, we respond to a similar reality as that presented by Almqvist, Benedict and Kanellopoulos (2017) when they ask the [following] questions: 'how can we re-think the political dimensions of creative music education pedagogies in the face of recent educational policy trends? ... How can we create forms of music education practice and research that induce a continuous interplay between acting and thinking?' (p. 6). But we do so from the perspective of *phronesis*, as in the practical competence and wisdom developing over time. As such, it is important to emphasise that such development is seen through the lenses of the practising performer in between classes, rather than during them.

From a perspective rooted in music education we ask: What more can the time spent learning an instrument offer beyond a mechanical accommodation of sensor-motor skills and the realisation of an artistic vision? More specific, what space of personal maturing and self-reflection does the same situation provide? The approach is, through philosophical perspectives and particularly through the neoliberalist-policy-critical lenses of Martha C. Nussbaum, to explore how the practise session can be something more than mere training. This exploration can be instrumentally fostered through a formal or informal study environment and through a practical pedagogical approach. The goal is not to reach a specific end — i.e., defined learning outcomes — but rather to result in the student transcending the professional competence acquisition situation to gain wisdom for a broader perspective.

We will here address how we perceive the conceptual ecology in which our modified alignment will proceed. *Phronesis*, as many other Aristotelian concepts, has imbued many, sometimes contrasting, readings (see e.g. Surpresant, 2012; Svenaeus, 2014; Wivestad, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2014; Noel, 1999). We will assume the approach

to *phronesis* suggested by Hansen (2007; Table 1) which we understand as a sort of compartmentalisation of various steps leading from the particular-present-human to the transcending-universal-*cosmos* (Figure 1). Identifying scientific understanding of education, he remarks, as a *normative* practice supported by 'empirical evidence-based research[,] can tell us what *worked*, but cannot tell us what works' as we miss out on some of the potential education research may offer (p. 16). That is, rather than setting out to qualify education praxis objectively in retrospect with a clear, preconcieved agenda for already known ends, we lose sight of the more experienced and intuition based notions of what works here and now, in the situation, and what may work in the future (p. 16). This instrumental view is not favourable for ethics, he argues while pointing to the underrepresentation of the more existential and ontological dimensions, as it often represents more *poeisis*-based notions of *phronesis* in terms of 'an emancipated citizen who is very conscious about his or her own values and norms, and who acts according to those deliberated and chosen values …[, becoming] a political means for something else … [—] a conservative element'. The application of *Sophia*, Socratic *Eros* of *Sophia*, and his own conception of *authenticity*, he suggests, can help put things in perspective and situate the *phronesis* as a lower level wisdom on the path towards higher level Sophia (cf. Table 1 and Figure 1). Authenticity, however, has also often been used in an instrumental way. *Phronesis*, in much educational research, is often closely linked to professional practice within a given society and culture. It is '… to find the general *within* the particular and see it from an ethical perspective, that is, how can this activity make the life of the student a more wise, good and beautiful life?' (p. 19). Moreover, Hansen warns us: '*Phronesis* can so easily, in a modern conceptualisation and use, be transformed into something quite different [i.e., instrumental and conservative applications] … the concept of phronesis is often misused in contemporary educational research and theory in subtle ways' (p. 19). *Authenticity, on the other hand*, (as outlined by Hansen) illuminates

the same practice from an existential point of view. That is, 'one's ontological relation to Being itself — it is not necessarily identical with the process of reflecting on the ethics and values of tacit and practical knowledge in professional actions and in the culture in which this profession is embodied' (p. 23). It would be interesting then to create a space within which existential reflection beyond *episteme* (scientific knowledge, to know), *techne* (craftsmanship, crafts, art) or *phronesis* can foster a Socratic *Eros*; 'That is, the ability to wonder over fundamental issues and to long for knowledge or, better yet, wisdom about what the Good Life is, [... to be] lovers of wisdom, that is, *philo-sophers*' (pp. 17–18, 20 and 22–24). Or as Stein M. Wivestad holds, '*[p]hronesis* is ... an active condition for inexact practical wisdom...' (Wivestad, 2008, p. 310). The present article then seeks to theorize and, in the end, also propose a practical pedagogical means (instrumental, no less) of promoting this endeavour based on this worldview, drawing particular support from Martha C. Nussbaum.

In the present article, we will focus on the more autonomous aspects of the everyday, informal practice session of developing musicians and bring in perspectives from philosophy. First, we explore the practise session-case in particular. Secondly, we will address the individual within the situation in relation to the exterior world while proposing an ecology to serve as a framework. Here we apply interaction through social media as a case. Thirdly, we seek to further develop the practice-session as a potential activity for personal growth. Next, we make a note of the related context of ensemble practice. Finally, we propose a logbook exercise to strategically enable this growth-process in practice.

	Poeisis	*Praxis*	*Phronesis*	*Authenticity*	*Socratic Eros*	*Sophia*
Description	Incorporating critique in practice. Connects scientific knowledge and practical skills.	Exercising judgement when practising to make the right decisions according to context. Connected to propositio nal and tacit knowledge.	Situates poiesis and praxis as part of the human condition The ability to introduce ethical perspectives within and from the particular and how one relates to the community.	An existential perspective	The pursuit of divine wisdom (Sophia) using philosophy to transcend the current knowledge and values of a given society and culture.	An achieved state of divine *wisdom* and a way of living

Table 1: Hansen's (2007) categorisation of Aristotle's concepts.

A figurative, rough approximation of Hansen's (2007) compartmentalisation of poeisis, praxis, phronesis, authenticity, *Eros* and Sophia. Rolfhamre's illustration.



Figure 1: A figurative, rough approximation of Hansen's (2007) compartmentalisation of poeisis, praxis, phronesis, authenticity, Eros and Sophia. Rolfhamre's illustration.

The practise-session

What is particular in music performance, in our view, is that it effectively brings together two rather opposing concepts: interpretative practices to understand the ideas and thoughts of others and phenomenological approaches based on our own perspectives. Musical interpretation can, thus, not be effectively equalled with interpretative practices alone, but it also needs to accept the premises of phenomenological activities as well; it is a matter of both interpreting (and understanding) and experien-

cing. (This is also what makes study fields such as artistic research, or arts-based research, difficult to define normatively, reaching a consensus, because where do we draw the line between dichotomies such as research/not-research, arts-based/not arts-based, etc.).

It is rather commonplace that the practise-session forms an important context for the development of the performing artist. This is where we patiently spend our time to become better than we currently are at doing something through repetitious meditations, so to say. We can, then, regard the practise-session itself as an aesthetic event, because it is an integrated part of the aesthetic object we seek to create to present to the audience.

We can utilise Denis Dutton's (2002) seven aesthetic universals to compartmentalise and sort the matter out:

I *Expertise or virtuosity*: Admiration of recognisable, technical skills

II *Non-utilitarian pleasure*: Artwork as pleasure itself, rather than a practical tool or knowledge

III *Style*: According to rules of form and composition. Involves borrowing and alteration

IV *Criticism*: Artwork experienced through the critical language describing or discussing it.

V *Imitation*: *Mimesis* in its relevant historical context

VI *'Special' focus*: Something different from normal life. Experiencing the other

VII *An imaginative, poetic experience for both producers and audiences*: Experiencing a dream-state

The practise-session has the potential of offering a 'space' where the performer can experience a sensation from which they may deduce their current level and development of virtuosity (Dutton first aesthetic universal; D I). When they become technically better at a certain exercise, it can be rewarding when a certain level of skill is

achieved. We can also set ourselves new goals from the admiration of someone else's skills. But this is not only true for future states, because they can equally be satisfied by their current level of skill. Thus, the practise-session can function as a praxis in the Aristotelian sense.

We may also practise for the sake of pleasure itself, because we like doing it without there necessarily being a good reason for it. Simply spending time alone (or with others) to enjoy music as a practice-session, can be a good enough reason to sit hour upon hour playing (D II). At some point, we can, furthermore, possibly reach a state where something special occurs by, for instance, reaching a state of flow where time 'ceases to exist' and we can work 'forever' without feeling the need to stop. We can achieve a state of 'special' by experiencing a new mental state, such as suddenly gaining new wisdom about our practise, or something completely different (D VI; cf. D II). In this respect, the practise-session can also enable a sense of transcendence from the mundane to some higher order existential state and make room for Socratic *Eros*.

We can experience our practice-session through how we relate to style. Both relating to performance practice and -tradition, we can value our activity according to us knowing or learning more of certain rules of engagement. We may experience positive feelings from performing a musical style that fits us or enhances our present mental status, etc. As such, it can *enhance our sense of being part of a given artistic community* (because we relate to a certain style which is socially and culturally dependent), *pinpoint a sensation of continuity and development both as performing artists and as human beings.*

We may contextualise our practice-session when speaking to others, not only colleagues and professionals, but also with family and friends. We can learn more both about ourselves, as well as the music we perform. This critique can also be an inner

dialogue with ourselves, where we put words and discourse (expressed or imagined) onto our practice. Therefore, it can effectively combine the above situation contingent agencies with *reflection, self-awareness* and *kinetic pleasure.*

We can experience our practice-session by imitating a certain context, or idol. We can pretend to be someone we admire for inspiration. In certain music there is a clear imitative feature, which we can seek to reproduce according to its dedication (e.g. birdsong and other instruments), etc. This can also induce or inspire states of pure fantasy where we can be swept away, while performing, to distant lands, vast oceans or even non-existing places.

The attentive reader may have noticed that, embedded in our reading of Dutton's aesthetic universals, a parallel compartmentalization offered by David Hesmondhalgh who aptly writes about the potential offered by the sounding arts has been present. According to him, and which has already been hinted to above but, now, presented collectedly, music can: (1) 'heighten people's awareness of continuity and development in life'; (2) 'enhance our sense of sociality and community'; (3) 'can combine a healthy integration of different aspects of our being, combining reflection and self-awareness with kinetic pleasure'; (4) 'heighten our understanding of how others might think and feel'; (5) be 'potentially good at being a practice in the Aristotelian sense' (Hesmondhalgh, 2012, pp. 371–373). Dutton's aesthetic universals outlines a way of understanding artistic practices in a performance related way in which the act of practising transcends the mechanics of the situation and offers a space for philosophy to join procedure. Supported by Hesmondhalgh's fitting potentials of music, we can regard the practice session as a way of practising art that has transformative potential and agency as aesthetic acts themselves. Another author arguing down these lines is Nussbaum who emphasises this 'potential space' in particular when she writes:

> I have said that the 'potential space' of aesthetic activity is a space with which we investigate and try out some of life's possibilities. ... The aesthetic activity, which takes place in a safe and protected 'potential space' where our own safety is not immediately threatened, harnesses the pleasure of exploring to the neediness and insufficiency that is its object, thus making our limitations pleasing, and at least somewhat less threatening, to ourselves. (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 243–244)

It is just because '... we are in a context of safety, we are also encouraged to have a range of reactive emotions' (p. 246) that the practice-session can function as a humanistic free-space in which we can be able to see things from new perspectives — both known and un-known, or provocative and pleasing to us — and try on new roles without us being judged by others. We are suddenly allowed to behave well or badly, proper and improper, without having to mean it for real. At a superficial, musical level, we can choose to perform unmusically or in a manner completely different from what we usually prefer without that being a truth of our aesthetic ideology. Rather, we can use it as an exercise in ethics, to learn more about how that feels to better 'understand' those who play in that manner. We deliberately use quotation-marks here because we, of course, cannot know the perspectives of others simply by imitating them; but that is not at all the point, because what is interesting is to broaden our vocabulary of perspectives that are different from ours and, hence, improve our ability to see different sides of others in a democratic sense. However, it is interesting to note that this imitation is an embodied and multisensorial experience and thus involves us as human beings in a more complete manner than simply using our imagination and empathy in our attempts at relating to others. Put simply, during the practise-session, as an aesthetic event and potential space, we can 'walk in someone else's shoes', if only for a short period of time. This also emphasises our

earlier point that music performance is both an interpretative practice and a phenomenal one.

We once made a trip to Italy (which was Rolfhamre's first visit there) to perform a concert and present research papers during a seminar in Tarquinia. On our way back to the airport, we also made a short trip to Rome to let Rolfhamre see what all the fuss was about. As a first timer, what hit him when he wandered about trying to make the most of the short trip, was a phenomenologico-epistemological revelation. Being in Italy suddenly gave Rolfhamre a new sense of understanding Italian music. 'Of course, the aesthetic design is the way it is, because this is Italy'. In terms of Research-practice (capital R intended), this is easily dismissed as nonsense, but in terms of personal artistic practice it is not. What happened was that he got a sense of culture, context and social flow (sitting at a coffee-shop, watching people walk by) which gave him a better sense of the other, the Italians. In retrospect, this experience has completely changed how (in parallel to his studies of Italian folk music) he relates to both their music and them as persons whenever he meets with them. Sound research-practices aside, the meta-ethical, as well as normative ethics values, are evident. And, because of this external experience, his potential space during the research-session, at least when performing the related styles of music, was changed. In this respect, Rolfhamre expanded the practise-session to include external experiences, which he brought with himself into the practise-room the next time. Indeed, as Marcel Cobussen once pointed out, '... through music ..., ethics, hospitality and alterity come into existence and receive (specific) meaning. ... The relation between ethics and music affects and thus changes both' (Cobussen & Nielsen, 2016, p. 23).

It is just because of this, that the practise-session, as an aesthetic activity and potential space, can encompass democratic values. It is not governed by codes of conduct, we are free to say whatever we wish to say, we can use music to better understand the perspectives, thoughts and practices of others, we have devoted time to be

ourselves and ask questions about who we are and what matters to us. This can also bring us to think of the psychoanalyst and pædiatrician Donald W. Winnicott who speaks of the 'transformative space' in which, he argues, the arts preserve and cultivate a growing-space for, most prominently, empathy. The 'play space' refers to a continuation of children's games and roleplaying (Winnicott, 2005; Nussbaum, 2010, p. 101).

Let us now turn our focus away from the individual alone and return to the matter of social media. Particularly in light of Dutton's aesthetic (D IV, in Table 1 above), how does sharing influence our practise-session? This is obviously a vast, multi-faceted subject which we cannot treat in full here, so we will let YouTube and Facebook suffice as a starting point for the discussion.

Auto-biographical exposure, and bursting the bubble

If one joins social networks such as YouTube or Facebook-groups (among many other possibilities), it is easy to argue that what is among the most popular things to share for guitarists and lutenists, for instance (Rolfhamre chooses this instrumental group because of his own disposition as a performer and because he has followed them for years), are films of themselves performing at home or at a concert (other competing categories involves films of colleagues in action and links to source material). Sticking with the focus on the practise-session, now caught on film, this is interesting because the musicians are effectively inviting people into their potential space and aesthetic activity. They are tearing down the walls surrounding their 'context of safety', using Nussbaum's earlier phrasing, and exposing themselves for criticism and inclusion into the public discourse.

It seems to us that we, perhaps unconsciously, often adopt a somewhat platonic view of the mimetic object in Classical music performance, in which we assume that there is some perfect template somewhere out there that we must imitate through our musical activities. Of course, any such template is socially and culturally constructed rather than universal truths of the cosmos, but such a point of view insists on an up-down perspective, where the 'almighty correct performance' is to be adopted and cultivated by the performer. It constitutes not only how we place ourselves within society, but also what we can contribute to it. In that sense, we are adopting a perspective where each individual's musical activity contributes to shape what a musical activity is and will be expected to be. Then, rather than simply following Foucault's example of unveiling the social 'templates' to which society wishes us to conform, we can see our role as individuals to accept that template or not. What we are suggesting here is not by any means anarchy or asking for a utopia, but merely to understand our responsibility to shape music, as a field of study and aesthetic object, through our activities within it, noting that 'responsibility', here, extends beyond being just a matter of accepting this or that social 'template'. Again, the practise-session provides not only a space for contemplating meta-ethics, but it also offers a forum to contribute to what musical practise could or should be. And when we later expose ourselves to the public, or meet the exposure of our fellow musicians, we can meet them with respect to cultivate new perspectives, rather than exercising our judgement according to the present template. We easily take the position that we know how music should be performed better than people did before us, but so did they (at least theoretically), and so shall future generations think of us. But this continual 'improvement' of an 'objective work of art' is not the most fruitful perspective. Rather, the work as experience has greater transformative potential. In Gadamer's words: '... that the work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that changes the person who

experiences it' (Gadamer, 2013, p. 107). This may be true for all experiencing it, both the audience and those producing the experience, as they perceive their own creation. Arguably, developing an ability to see and emphasize with the perspectives of others does not a democracy make, but it supplies important prerequisites for democratic processes to be possible and effective for the common good. And, the process of exposing oneself to such transformative spaces, while exercising critical thinking and shifts of perspectives, also serves the purpose of the Socratic *Eros* well.

Moving on, what we can begin to see here is an ecosystem-like procedure where one activity or state of being leads to another in a circular manner (Figure 2). This circulation of acts can, furthermore, cumulatively enable the practice-session to function as an incubator for Humanistic values and a preparation for social acts and democratic contribution.



Figure 2: A suggested ecology for the practice-session as an incubator for Humanistic values and preparation for social acts and democratic contribution. Rolfhamre's illustration.

First, we have the practise-session as an aesthetic event.

Secondly, through the practise-session, we can unleash a potential space in which we can safely experience, explore and develop ourselves and our understanding of the other. These perspectives form an important part of who we are as humans, musicians and social actors, as well as how we treat and relate to others.

Thirdly, we expose ourselves to the non-safe outside-world — in this particular case, through social media — to receive feedback and, hopefully, also praise. As this proceeds over time, sharing more and more material of us performing, we are starting to create a digital, auto-biographical representation of whom we are as persons which others use to make an opinion of us. Subsequently, their opinions take our whole 'self' as subject, as they perceive it. And it is when there is a dissonance between this judgement and our own, perceived self-image that we may experience negative critique towards our person. It is important to emphasise that the exposition through social media is a more vulnerable position than other activities leading from the creative isolation of the practice room to the 'outer' world. In such cases, the activity is more prepared and in more direct contact with the 'outer' world, whereas the nature of social media is precisely that the private 'potential space' of the practice session is exposed. When posting videos or recordings of the practice session, it transforms from a 'safe, potential space'to that of a performance situation. The personal nature of social media blurs the lines between a more prepared and formal performance and a practice session, exposing the performer in a more vulnerable situation and may, as such, affect the performer differently from other more moderated situations such as non-published, individual practice or pre-planned concerts.

Fourthly, the manner in which we are met shapes not only how we perform one particular piece of music, or how we relate to that social group, but it also has the potential of having us re-evaluate ourselves, both as humans and as musicians, and re-

consider our values. To make a very short, efficient example, by repeatedly being negatively met within a group of musicians whom we admire and aspire to be part of, we may over time build a grudge towards them which in its most severe repercussions can result in us feeling insecure about ourselves, lose the pleasure of performing music and perhaps even stimulate a scepticism towards the arts in general — 'I never managed to fit in; I always felt excluded and frowned upon. But perhaps they were right? Maybe I should spend my time doing something more constructive than wasting it on mere leisure?' In this particular, fictional case: note how it insinuates issues relating to people being discouraged to contribute with their wits alongside their working-abilities. We will soon return to this matter. (There are, of course, many less dramatic variants that could have been mentioned, and the development described here is highly context-dependant, but this shows the situation's negative potential at its fullest. It may not happen, but it could.)

Fifthly, we bring our assessments of our meeting with the outside-world with us when we once more return to the practising-session, starting the cycle all over again, once more.

Why it matters – the ecology-like procedure in context

In 2010, Martha Nussbaum made an important claim, in her manifesto *Not for Profit: Why the Democracy Needs the Humanities*, that: 'Thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive' (p. 2); and, furthermore, that '[e]ducation is not just for citizenship. It prepares people for employment and, importantly, for meaningful lives' (p. 9). What she points to, here, is the dangerous development (at least in terms of the democracy) throughout the World's societies, to undermine the human-

ities in all levels of education. Effectively, this means that the World's governments systematically seek to provide their citizens with less education in critical thinking, less training in self-reflectiveness and compassionate morality. But these are important parts of what constitutes the Humanities and its everlasting contribution to society and democracy. Nussbaum writes: 'These abilities are associated with the humanities and the arts: the ability to think critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach world problems as a "citizen of the world"; and, finally, the ability to imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person' (p. 7). Such features are dangerous to the quest of the modern governments, she claims: '[i]n the context of the old paradigm of what it is for a nation to develop, what is on everyone's lips is the need for an education that promotes national development seen as economic growth' (p.17). That is, nations around the World increasingly seek to strengthen economic growth, sustainability and productivity — that is quantifiable data — at the cost of the humanities, which rather represents the qualitative:

> The goal of a nation, says this model of development, should be economic growth. Never mind about distribution and social equality, never mind about the preconditions of stable democracy, never mind about the quality of race and gender relations, never mind about the improvement of other aspects of a human being's quality of life that are not well linked to economic growth. (Empirical studies have by now shown that political liberty, health, and education are all poorly correlated with growth.) (p. 14)

To express this concept in another way, we can look to the basic metaphors that support this worldview. In our culture, time is a valuable commodity, and we see it as a limited resource, used to accomplish our goals.

> These practices are relatively new in the history of the human race, and by no means do they exist in all cultures. They have arisen in modern industrialized societies and structure our basic everyday activities in a very profound way.

> Corresponding to the fact that we act as if time is a valuable commodity — a limited resource, even money — we conceive of time that way. Thus we understand and experience time as the kind of thing that can be spent, wasted, budgeted, invested wisely or poorly, saved, or squandered (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, loc.168).

Living by such metaphorical concepts as ‘time is money’, ‘time is a limited resource’ and ‘time is a valuable commodity’ conceptualises time by using our everyday experiences with money, limited resources and valuable commodities. This is a part of our culture, not a truth, and it is important to remember that there are cultures where time is none of these things (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, locs.168–179). Linking this to a society where economic growth is the goal and where we apply these metaphors to how we view time, this entails a competition for our time resources. How we spend our time, then, can be measured in terms of profit and how it benefits economic growth. It is evident that the Arts and Humanities rarely measure up in the competition for direct financial output, compared to business expansion and profitable growth. This is important to note, because, as we mentioned initially, deliberate practise takes time. How we prioritize our time, then, in today’s competitive world, is of the outmost importance. And we argue that time spent on deliberate practice within the Arts and Humanities, actually is time well spent, both for each individual and society and democracy as a whole.

To complement this point of view further, on a side note from music performance learning, we read in a recent news-article by Lucy-Emilie Andersen (2018), in Utrop: Norges første flerkulturelle avis & tv (i.e. ‘Shout-out: Norway’s First Multi-Cultural Newspaper and TV’), how fruitful it is to employ immigrants:

Gir global fordel

Ifølge den kanadiske undersøkelsen «Mangfoldets utbytte: Canadas globale fordel» forfattet av Bessma Momani og Jillian Stirk, er det viktig for samfunns-regnskapet at innvandrere kommer ut i arbeid, noe bedriftene også vil tjene på.

– I nesten alle sektorer er det et betydelig og positivt sammenfall mellom flerkulturelt mangfold og økt produktivitet og inntekt. Momani og Stirk argumenterer for at mangfold i arbeidslivet er et viktig bidrag for å styrke Canadas konkurranseevne.

Undersøkelsen avslørte at bedrifter som øker andelen innvandrere i staben med èn prosent i gjennomsnitt øker inntektene med 2,4 prosent og produktiviteten med 0,5 prosent. I deler av næringslivet der omstillingene er størst og veksten høyest er forskjellen atskillig større. (Andersen, 2018)

(*Gives a Global Advantage*

According to the Canadian study 'Diversity Dividend: Canada's Global Advantage' [i.e. Momani and Stirk, 2017], authored by Bessma Momani and Jillian Stirk, it is important for the society's accounts that immigrants achieve employment, which is something that the corporations also will benefit from.

– In almost all sectors, there is a considerable and positive relation between multi-cultural diversity and increased productivity and income. Momani and Stirk argue that diversity in work-life is an important contribution to strengthen Canada's competitiveness.

The study revealed that corporations that increase their share of immigrant workers by 1%, increase their average pay-off with 2.4% and their productivity with 0.5%. In the areas of work-life where the adjustments are the greatest and the growth the highest, the difference is even more prominent.) (Our own translation)

The problem addressed by Nussbaum, for instance, is very prominent in the above symptomatic news-article. Diversity is not at all mentioned as being good for compassion, tolerance and understanding, but good for increased income and productivity (read: work better, earn more and think less). Or as put to words by Epictetus, written in A.D. 135 in his *Enchiridion*: 'No man who loves money, and loves pleasure, and loves fame, also loves mankind, but only he who loves virtue' (2004, p. 25). The value of diversity is even quantifiable, and it increases competitiveness. 'Competitiveness' itself, is not even a socially or morally stimulating word; appearing not until well into the nineteenth century, it establishes something pertaining or involving competition (from Latin *competit-*, past participle stem of *competere*; the latter with relations, as we know and use the word today, back to the fifteenth century's Middle French *compéter*, meaning 'to be in rivalry with') (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2018a and 2018b). Clearly, 'to be in rivalry with' someone is not naturally compatible and equal to inclusion, selflessness and concurrency which are often valued factors when stimulating a moral and social community.

Returning to music performance learning, then, we may understand how having the time to practice and learn music is a privilege, that is, we have the time to spare or invest in becoming prolific and flourishing music performers. But, we must choose carefully and deliberately how we utilise and manage that privilege and for what ends—noteworthy, in cases where music performance is a person's occupation or vocation. Do we, for instance, do it to win the competition over others and secure market shares with an added hope of financial prosperity? Or, is the aim of the activity to connect with the listener on an emotive plane? Is it perhaps an act of self-indulgence or the desire to experience an aesthetic event for its own sake? Rhetorical questions aside, the aim and scope of why we practice and learn music and how we approach it, arguably, have direct influence on what we achieve from doing so. And, similar to the diversity-themed news-article above, we must be careful to detect to what degree ethics plays a defining role in what we do. To put it bluntly for a rhetorical point: Are democratic perspectives, diversity and compassion good because they are related to kindness and love, or are they good only if they are profitable?

Moreover, in a discussion of the destructive ideologies, or modern myths, prevalent in the twentieth century, Karen Armstrong explains how myths should demand more of us than pure reason and how they need to emphasise compassion:

> They have not been infused with the spirit of compassion, respect for sacredness of all life, or with what Confucius called 'leaning'. These destructive mythologies have been narrowly racial, ethnic, denominational and egotistic, an attempt to exalt the self by demonising the other. We cannot counter these bad myths with reason alone, because undiluted *logos* cannot deal with such deep-rooted, unexorcised fears, desires and neuroses. That is the role of an ethically and spiritually informed mythology.
>
> We need myths that will help us to identify with all our fellow-beings, not simply with those who belong to our ethnic, national or ideological tribe. We need myths that help us to realise the importance of compassion, which is not always regarded as sufficiently productive or efficient in our pragmatic, rational world (Armstrong, 2005, p. 142).

The overarching idea in Armstrong's argument corresponds well with Nussbaum's agenda. We see that society's overall priorities originate in the ideology, myth, metaphorical concepts and ideas that are pervasive in our culture. And reason alone cannot counter 'these bad myths'. Arts and Humanities provide a counter-point in which we operate at another level than reason alone. 'A novel, like a myth, teaches us to see the world differently; it shows us how to look into our own hearts and to see our world from a perspective that goes beyond our own self-interest' (Armstrong, 2005, p. 155). *In Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature* (1990) Nussbaum argues in a similar manner for the need for another mode of expressing truths about the human condition and life. In discussing works by Henry James and Marcel Proust, she presents their claim on the importance of literature:

> [...] only the style of a certain sort of narrative artist (and not, for example, the style associated with the abstract theoretical treatise) can adequately state certain important truths about the world, embodying them in its shape and setting up in the reader the activities that are appropriate for grasping them. (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 6)

Nussbaum argues on the same line as Armstrong. Artistic and poetic expressions, as opposed to abstract and theoretical ways of expression, enables humans to grasp certain important truths about the world. Further on she argues the importance of emotions for an ethical life and how literature and artistic expression play a crucial role in strengthening these qualities and supporting an empathetic and ethical outlook on life (Nussbaum, 1990).

How, then, is this relevant to the individual musician sitting in the practising-space, preparing for a concert? Well, it is not much because practising an instrument itself automatically solves the world's problems, but rather because it provides a potential space in which all benefits from the Humanities described by Armstrong and Nussbaum above, can grow alongside the opportunity for self-reflection, alone-time and personal growth. Furthermore, it can also become part of a social interaction in which we learn to relate to others and contribute to social- and cultural constructions. These matters are what concerns us in this article. The aim is to look at the practising-session (or sometimes even a formalised practise-ritual) as something more than a mere preparation-process and unravel its potential as a personal space, self-reflective activity and in turn as a forum for developing the foundation for a sustained, reflected and democratic living.

An ethical perspective

The field of Ethics includes a number of overreaching questions about how we could, should or would lead our lives, alone and together, particularly focusing on matters such as morality, compassion, desire, empathy and others. How we subsequently relate to such issues, determines the framework for how we interact with others, how we regard ourselves and how we seek to contribute to a better present and future. During the practise-session, we spend hours and hours analysing ourselves, our musical abilities and actions; we repeat the same thing over and over until we master it, hopefully resulting in a sense of mastery; we try to develop strategies that make us a better musician and performer by participating or producing pedagogically accurate activities; if rehearsing an ensemble-composition, we also try to relate ourselves to the other parts of the ensemble and attempt to foresee their approach to the music to prepare ourselves for the first rehearsal; we imagine how the audience will receive our performance and if we will be able to gain their approval (if that is of importance to us); and more.

Common to all these activities is the social relationship, either relating to others or to ourselves. Nussbaum makes a special point of music's potential for personal development and growth: 'Music is an especially rich source of emotional experiences and has frequently been taken to offer us insight into the nature of the emotional life' (2001, p. 7). This insight into our emotional life is a vital part of self-exploration, empathy and compassion; both for us to understand who we are, which forms the values by which we relate to the rest of the World, as well as our surroundings, and for us to understand whom others are so that we can meet and greet them with tolerance, understanding and interest. Furthermore, who we are is also culturally and socially constructed locally, nationally and internationally. 'First and most obviously, the criteria for the appropriate behavioural manifestation of emotions such as fear

and anger are socially taught and may vary considerably from society to society' (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 157). In this sense, drawing on post-structuralist thinking, we define much of our being through identifying our sameness and otherness to others. (In a similar fashion, Mary Midgeley asks, when critically addressing more strict, relativistic ethics: '[i]f we can't judge other cultures, can we really judge our own?' [Midgeley, 2010, p. 324]) That is, if I am kind, that means that I also have a sense of what is 'not kind'; if we are a wealthy and prosperous nation, then we have made up an idea of which countries that are not. And here is what makes the news-article mentioned above so striking: first, that it places all nationalities (understood from 'diversity') into a single societal machinery to produce income, productivity and wealth; secondly, that there is a perceived singular solution to how to run the world: economy, sustainability and productivity; thirdly, that emotion, compassion and critical thought is second-rate, not even mentioned in the article, and all that matters is that persons unite for the common economy. To its furthest extent, this last deduction can also be read as an assumption that individuality and self-exploration are unimportant, which strongly constrains a working concept of democracy (in the terms of what democracy is for, and whose voice may be relevantly heard within it). As long as we produce and contribute to 'the greater good,' our personal lives are our own business and, hence, Socratic *Eros* is figuratively pushed downwards (fig. 1 above) towards praxis and poesis to play an instrumental role for society rather than fostering us to transcend society for the sake of not pre-defined wisdom. Wisdom that may later inform and guide democratic processes onward. This is not to say that an instrumental "downward" perspective (again, cf. fig. 1 above) cannot serve democracy well, but it leads to a very different community which arguably strays away from the search of the higher order wisdom and empathy that we have been occupied with here.

On a daily basis, many insist on sharing our personal lives through social media in a belief that what we had for breakfast, how much weight we have managed to lose or

asking for empathy when we are ill are important. As we see it, this creates a sort of parallel reality where we can seek human connection and empathy as it slowly becomes secondary to society. According to Jill Walker Rettberg, '[b]logs and online diaries are obvious descendents [sic!] of the diaries and autobiographies of past centuries' (2014, p. 7). Yes, there is a huge potential here for critical thought and other self-developmental, compassion-stimulating activities, but since we are not normally stimulated to think critically as part of the societal machinery — a 'truth' with modifications and degrees, of course, but for the sake of making a rhetorical point in line with Nussbaum's reasoning above — we do not necessarily know what the potential of that social-media-space is or could be. Rettberg suggests that '[s]ocial media is about communication with others, but we should be equally aware of how we use social media to reflect upon ourselves' (p. 12), and, furthermore, that '[o]ur shared ideas about what moments and milestones should be documented in life act as a cultural filter that affects our choices' (p. 24). Therefore, '[s]elf-representation with digital technologies is also self-documentation. We think not only about how to present ourselves to others, but also log or record moments of our lives for ourselves to remember them in the future' (p. 11). But this is touching on matters that are, for the moment premature, so let us return to this later on.

In the end, the communication and self reflection of social media is not the main arena for the practice session. We argue that the individual, practise-sessions of musicians can serve as a space for developing ourselves as humans and fellow men, because it is dedicated time to spend in our own company, or in the ensemble-situation, in company with the selected few. We shall linger a bit on this personal space before moving on to other matters.

Practising and personal space

Susan Cain presents some interesting perspectives regarding the personalities of the individuals relating themselves to our present society in her *Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can't Stop Talking*. (In this article, we have used a Norwegian translation of the book called *Stille: introvert styrke i en verden som aldri slutter å snakke*, 2013.) In the Western world, we live within a systemised worldview that glorifies the extroverted ideal. This means, that success is to be a socially active and collaborative leader who enjoys being in the spotlight. Such a person, according to Cain's discourse, is one who prefers action before contemplation (also implying quick, spontaneous decisions before slow, calculated ones), risk before caution and certainties before doubts.[2] They like collaboration and working in teams and are also, socially 'pack-animals'. Technologically gifted introverts, especially those whom have gained a considerable wealth and success, seem to be one exception since they, by their competence, provide the foundation of the technological society we set out to create. They are, therefore, excused. This extroverted ideal is also discernible in children's TV-shows making the ideal available to us already from an early age. Research also shows that we seem to value those speaking at a fast pace as more competent than those speaking slowly (pp. 16–18). What is particularly interesting, when Cain presents her case, is that this development of the extroverted ideal in the USA seems to have coincided with the idolisation of film-stars in the 1920's and -30's. (For whom were better to have as one's ideal than the personal magnetism of a star of the big screen?) And not only did the new up-and-coming ideal present themselves in the cinemas, but also in everyday commercials telling us how to live our lives (of course, as a result of us using their products). Also, with the rise of the extroverted ideal and

2 As Epictetus chose to phrase it: '[i]f you begin by admiring little things, you will not be thought worthy of great things: but if you despise the little, you will be greatly admired' (2004, p. 34).

the new idolisation of the film-star, psychology-researchers started to publish about inferiority for real and articles on children's upbringing began to appear telling us how to raise our children to have 'winning personalities'; it was no longer socially acceptable to be quiet and introvert, because extroversion and continuous social activities were 'the way to go'. Even more symptomatic of this is discussion, Cain points out, is that the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV)* (which has now been succeeded by revised DSM-V) even categorises the fear of speaking in public as a disorder. Following this line of reasoning, it is clear that the type of resulting democracy, to which these acts of sorting out the unsuited, has its preferred agents. That is, those taking leading roles in shaping society should be of a specific caliber rather than representing a cross section of society as a whole. In relation to this, it is important to underline, as the psychologist Hendriksen also does when otherwise praising Cain's book, that introversion and social anxiety often gets mixed up. It is not uncommon to be anxious and introverted, but the concepts are actually quite different. She describes that introversion is born, while social anxiety is made. Further; with introversion, solitude makes you feel good, but with social anxiety, it just makes you less anxious. To specify, social anxiety thrives on perfectionism (of the negative kind). And to sum up the differences: introversion is your way; social anxiety gets in your way, and by contrast, with non-anxious introversion you feel good and confident overall about yourself and how you present (Hendriksen, 2018). So, it is important to value the qualities of introversion, especially in these times, where these traits are often devalued. However, using introversion as an excuse for being socially anxious is not what we are discussing here. Hendriksen emphasises that '[w]e can bring out the best of ourselves—our conscientiousness, our empathy, our deep thinking and feeling, our high standards—through a willingness to try new things and, vitally, some support along the way' (Hendriksen, 2018). She further points out that '[a]s we stretch and grow, what will happen inside our brains? It has been established that

anything you do frequently can change your brain, from driving a taxi to playing the violin…' (Hendriksen, 2018). Practising both an instrument and the way in which you relate comfortably, empatihcally and confidently supports our case here in practising for democracy. It may also be pointed out that the practising session can also be understood as an introverted activity as we spend time alone (or in ensemble, a selected few), analysing our own activity over long periods of time.

From the 1940's on, several prominent American universities decided to, through their application-tests, de-prioritise (sometimes even exclude) those introverted, quiet applicants who did not show this 'winning personality' (pp. 36–44). This is also commented by Nussbaum:

> So critical thinking would not be a very important part of education for economic growth, and it has not been in states that have pursued this goal relentlessly, such as the Western Indian state of Gujarat, well known for its combination of technological sophistication with docility and group-think. The student's freedom of mind is dangerous if what is wanted is a group of technically trained obedient workers to carry out the plans of elites who are aiming at foreign investment and technological development. Critical thinking will, then, be discouraged—as it has so long been in the government schools of Gujarat. (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 20-21)

But perhaps this is the very idea itself. If, as Nussbaum put it, 'In the context of the old paradigm of what it is for a nation to develop, what is on everyone's lips is the need for an education that promotes national development seen as economic growth' (p.17), then perhaps this socialising is part of a societal machine to suppress space for contemplation and human self-development in the name of productivity and wealth.

In arguing the case that introversion and its qualities should be appreciated rather than limited, we do not state that introversion is superior to extroversion in relation

to the personal practice session and reflection space. Rather, in both individual and ensemble practice, the role and richness of manifold personalities working together has great value and is encouraged, as it promotes the ability to include several perspectives and encourage further reflection. Yet, it is not always clear what such reflection-space could entail; let us therefore turn our focus to knowledge production through reflected actions.

Practise-session and knowledge-production

Irit Rogoff develops what she calls *criticality*: '[i]n theoretical terms we have moved from criticism, to critique to criticality, to the actual inhabitation of a condition in which we are deeply embedded as well as being critically conscious' (Rogoff, 2006, p. 5). Her idea relates to a sort of being and critically thinking within a certain situation by inhabiting it. She makes a point of not only adding knowledge to the pre-existing, but also unlearning old information to be open for what the situation presents. This is, as we understand her, to secure that one does not anticipate knowledge prejudicially based on expectations formed by past knowledge, but stays open for the unforeseen as it appears and, at the same time, meets that knowledge critically. She writes, '"Criticality" as I perceive it is precisely in the operations of recognising the limitations of one's thought for one does not learn something new until one unlearns something old, otherwise one is simply adding information rather than rethinking a structure' (Rogoff, 2003 p. 1). Rather than standing outside a given situation, one becomes part of it. Rogoff unites 'that being studied' and 'those doing the studying'. You cannot stand outside and objectify it, and criticality is a state of duality in many ways. It is at the same time 'both empowered and disempowered', 'knowing and unknowing'. She names criticality as a mode of embodiment. We are in it, we cannot really exit this state or view it from a critical distance. Criticality 'marries our knowledge and our experience in ways that are not complimentary (Rogoff, 2006, p. 2).

For the performing musician, then, to unlock the practise-session as a potential space is to combine intellectual reflection with being in the moment. It is to 'unlearn' some of the old knowledge to open oneself for the unexpected new. And, it is to meet that new unexpected knowledge critically and openly to learn more about ourselves, others and music itself as a phenomenon. Arguably, with Cain fresh in mind, introversion can be an important feature to achieve this as it very much involves introspective processes, and the safe space of one's own practice to try out perspectives and roles, makes knowledge-creation in a Socratic-*Eros*-sense even more promising.

This is another point in which the Arts, or music in this particular case, shows its true potential for both knowledge-production and social development. It is also why the Arts in recent years has been recognised as a methodological perspective within other fields of study, such as in Social Science (Gergen and Gergen, 2018, p. 54), because it offers alternative, more practical ways of approaching various phenomena which effectively imbues non-intelectual perspectives rooted in, for instance, emotion, experience and tactility. Because, as previously stated, the potential space of the practise-session effectively opens for cultivation of creativity and imagination.

Ensemble practise: democracy or dictatorship?

Although, it is a distinct matter that deserves its own discourse, when arguing for the democratic value of the practising session it is difficult to overlook ensemble practice entirely. A brief mention of the topic must then be made before we return to the individual performer. As presented above, the potential space of trying out new ideas, other perspectives and points of view in private can be seen as a preparation for being a reflected, democratic citizen. But in an ensemble, the democracy is potentially practised in real-time. We do not talk of larger ensembles with conductors in this case, as they are presented with different challenges, and conductors, to put it in Goehr's

words, are 'in an uneasy position because they are simultaneously regarded as masters and servants'(in relation to leading the orchestra, but serving the composer's work) (Goehr, 2007 p.273).

How we relate to each other in an ensemble determines the outcome. In section III, on educating citizens, Nussbaum (2010), explains the process of child development in relation to empathy and reciprocity. Helplessness and insecurity lead to dependency and the need to 'lord it over others'. As a sense of independency develops, we learn to relate to others as an end and not just means to an end. This fact is important, because as performers in development, insecurity and a certain sense of helplessness can often occur, thus inciting the need to achieve a sense of control, which, in turn, can result in a need to control others and boss them around. Practising alone and being used to stepping forward as the sole focal point as a performer can also enforce this sort of behaviour. A performer seeing the other musicians as a means to their end, mere accompanists to their performance, does not strengthen democracy, rather the opposite. Thus, it is crucial that such prima-donna behaviour is discouraged, and that ensemble training emphasises the competencies identified by Nussbaum (2010). Such qualities are a sense of personal accountability, a tendency to see others as distinct individuals and a willingness to raise a critical voice, not necessarily siding with the majority on all matters.

We, Robin and Inga Marie , have experienced first-hand on several occasions how the complexity of interpretative practices and phenomenology are intertwined in ensemble practise. As we practise and perform as a duo, we prepare material individually and meet to practise together. The qualities named by Nussbaum are essential in a successful practise session on many levels. The practical level of respecting the other individual in holding them accountable and being accountable yourself, in how you prepare, how you spend the time practising together and how you voice opinions and thoughts, are all essential. The empathy in seeing the other as a distinct individual

and relating respectfully to each other creates a safe space for artistic practise. As insecurity leads to the need for control, a safe space is foundational in this context. Further, on a more subliminal level, the emotions that emerge through the artistic practise contribute to the aesthetic experience, and how these are received in the ensemble determines much of the outcome, even though this is a part of the practise that is often uncontrollable. This fact makes the ethical aspect of the ensemble practise and performance all the more important.

Proposing a logbook exercise

Naturally, the topics covered in this article have potentially raised more questions than they can possibly answer. But the answer here is not necessarily what is important, but what Socratic *Eros* they promote. In a form of response to Kristján Kristjánsson's plea for more publications on 'the actual cultivation of *phronesis*' (Kristjánsson, 2014, p. 152), the question that remains is how to initiate that process in the student, or for ourselves for that matter in a systematic, instrumental way? Taking the lead from Julia Annas' (2011) skill analogy of virtue, as something that can be practiced and improved as long as the subject actively aspires to realise some ideals and to improve, beyond inactively (accidentally, even) achieving that sort of status as a happenstance following mere routine. The search for virtue must be driven by the hope and the possibility of it ever to become a reality (Seneca, 1917, p. 22). So, in the sense that *phronesis* is considered one of the Aristotelian virtues (Surprenant, 2012, p. 221), this gives us hope that the practising session — as the potential space it offers, situated within a socio-political context to which the performer must relate to — can be active practices to aspire to transcend the everyday mechanics of the profession to become a contributing part of a greater societal apparatus. As Chris W. Surpresant reminds us, 'possessing *phronesis* requires both knowledge and action' (Surpresant, 2012, p. 226), and, in the words of Fredrik Svenaeus, it is '… an intellectual ability

which is perfected by experience … [and] a drive and desire to do the right thing' (Svenaeus, 2014, p. 295). Additionally, Aaron Kuntz and Austin Pickup upholds that '*[p]hronesis* further situates discussions of *what could be* within deliberations of *what should be'* (Kuntz and Pickup, 2016, p. 174; original emphases).

But to interpret Anna's (2011) intelligent virtue ethics as a simplistic alone will not suffice for *phronesis* to manifest itself. As Kristjánsson warns us, 'skills in instrument playing [… is] a single *techne*. *Phronesis* is, however, about the harmonious mastery of one's *whole life*.… it has to be shown that adequately learning a single skill also requires an all-round mastery of surrounding life tasks' (Kristjánsson, 2014, p. 163). In the spirit of Seneca's remark that the search for knowledge is led by those who perform the search' (Seneca, 1917, p. 9), we draw on Rolfhamre's experience in having his higher education musical instrument performance students write logbooks during their practice sessions to focus their work and development, we will propose a supplementary logbook-initiative that is more concerned with *phronesis* and *Eros*, than with *poeisis* and *praxis*.

Logbook exercise 1

The original logbook instruction is handed out at the beginning of the students' study (Figure 3). They ask the student to perform the simple task of using a small notebook (that will fit in their instrument case) and a pencil. During the practice sessions (or even during classes), they should take notes of their achievements using a neutral, problem solving linguistic tone for their flaws and mistakes, and positive, edifying one for their positive acts to achieve a sense of mastery without entering a negative spiral of 'talking oneself down', so to say, by fostering negative expectations from underachievement. In addition to providing traceability and developmental documentation, it, therefore, also provides an element of practising aural analysis, self-reflection to promote insight, a possibility of identifying and treating the cause of

problems rather than the symptoms, and, perhaps the most important, it can be brought to the instrument performance class to enable a grounded student-teacher dialogue in relation to how the student makes use of the time in between classes. The logbook, thus, functions at the level of the poeisis and praxis, with some possibility of entering more higher-level stages of phronesis at the discretion of the student themselves and the teacher. What would be interesting, however, is to introduce a similar activity to address higher level wisdom following the possibilities sketched out above at a later stage in the student's study (Figure 4).

Practice log

Bring to the first 3 lessons to have a dialogue with your teacher, after that you do it for yourself.
By prof. Robin Rolfhamre, 4 February 2020

What to do:

- Buy/find a small notebook and a pencil that fits your instrument case.
- Keep it in your instrument case at all times

Use:

- To take notes during your classes
- To make your practicing a conscious and effective experience.
- To make notes during extra-curricular activities

Purpose:

- Practicing analysis of your playing and development
- Learning to identify problems and positive things in your playing
- Make notes of feedback from tuition
- Dates enable you to track progress.

Content:

- Issues, for instance:
  - tensions in the left hand
  - improve planning of finger motion in right hand
  - what disturbed your concentration, what actions can you do to address the issues?
- Positives, for instance:
  - Thinking about… really helped the fluidity of bars x–x
  - On piece A it was a better experience to place the footstool in a higher position.
- What to concentrate on during the next session?

Examples:



Figure 3: Facsimile of the original logbook-instructions handed out to students. Rolfhamre's document.



Figure 4: The paper seeks to suggest a second logbook-instruction to replace the first at a later point in the study to facilitate the student's development towards ethical considerations. Log 1 corresponds to the lower left side of Figure 1, while Log 2 will seek to address the mid-section of the same figure. Rolfhamre's illustration.

Proposition: logbook exercise 2

The remaining question, then, is what such a second, higher-level logbook should entail and what sort of questions it should pose to the student. Returning to the ecology presented in Figure 2, we can extract the individual entries from its ecology, set them up against each other (still pursuing the aesthetic perspective of the growing-space above) to pinpoint a list of possible departures (Table 2).

Table 2: Extraction of methodological tools from Figure 2.

		A	B	C	D	E
		Practising as aesthetic event	**Potential space**	**Autobio-graphical documentati on and quantisation**	**Exposure and judgement**	**Assessment and influence**
1	**Practising as aesthetic event**		See **A2**	See **A3**	See **A4**	See **A5**
2	**Potential space**	How do we cultivate our practise as an ability to develop and grow? Is it a practise that intrigues us to be in?		See **B3**	See **B4**	See **B5**
3	**Autobiogra phical documentat ion and quantisatio n**	How do we normatively establish ourselves and what 'reality' are we presenting to ourselves, as well as to others?	What does our creative output and practise trigger in us? How do we interact with ourselves and what could be?		See **C4**	See **C5**
4	**Exposure and judgement**	How do we cultivate the full situation into an expression that we offer to others?	How do the expectation of, and actual reception we get influence our work process and our sense of	Does the collected entity of what we offer to the public contribute and stimulate the desired		See **D5**

			self?	effects? Does it provoke anything unexpected, and if so, what can we make of it?		
5	**Assessment and influence**	In what way does our practise offer more than learning a piece of music?	How do we judge the quality of, and what do we gain from our own experience in the present?	In what way does our artistic output influence others, contributing to the discourse? And how is our output influenced by others?	Do the effects produced by our public practise create an environment we wish to contribute to? Can we offer something else or something more?	

This exercise enables a set of phenomenological questions which could be listed accordingly and presented to the student in a somewhat rephrased manner:

Level 1:

(A2): How do you perceive and understand yourself when practising?

(A2): How do you experience your development when practising?

(A3): How do you perceive your identity?

(A3): How do you relate to the identities of others?

(A4): How do you cultivate your identity based on the full situation you are situated in and how does that relate to your artistic expression?

(A5): What additional knowledge/experiences do you gain from your practise session, beyond technically learning to play a piece of music?

Level 2:

(B3): What sort of emotion, thought-process, experience does your playing and conscious attempt on improving your playing trigger in you and how do you relate to and act on those sensations?

(B4): How does the expectation of what people might think of the musical performance that you prepare, as well as earlier *actual* reception conveyed to us by the audience (live or online), influence your working process and your sense of who you are, what you think you could become?

(B5): How do you judge the quality (however you may employ that term) of the experience itself and how do you think that you gain from that experience here and now, in the present?

Level 3:

(C4): When presenting your artistic work to an *actual* audience: Does your underlying intentions correspond to their reaction (as you perceive it)? Do you detect anything unexpected, and if so, what do you make of it?

(C5): In what way does our artistic output influence others, contributing to the collective artistic discourse? And how is our output influenced by others?

(D5): What can we contribute to the collective society?

Additionally, we may add some supplementary questions:

Level 4:

> (*phronesis*): How can you generalise the experiences and knowledge that you gain when practising? And how can you transfer those gains to other aspects of your life beyond your professional activities? What is your place/function in society? That is, what role do you want to play in the life of others as well as yours?
>
> (Hansen's *authenticity*): What is your perspective on life, how do you perceive yourself individually and in relation to others?
>
> (Socratic *Eros*): What way of living, and what higher aims do you aspire to? And what measures do you take to pursue that way of living?

One obvious critique of such an approach would be that the exercise is time consuming and irrelevant: 'are we not here to learn how to play an instrument?', one may ask. What is more, when a young student pursues a degree in music performance focusing only on artistry, that study programme alone is responsible for, as the Norwegian state regulations defines it, for example, to promote value creation, sustainable societies, and govern central perceptions of democracy, humanity and care (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2018). But we should not only strive to fulfil fluctuant policy-defined outcomes in an instrumental goal-oriented fashion, but also attempt to discover the world beyond the *polis* and the *sensus communis* in which we can rethink our futures in terms of what might be.

A second objection would be that it needs practice to think in terms of such perspectives, and that a generic student would perhaps not be able to grow properly through them by merely being handed a piece of paper (Logbook instructions 2). It is our belief and experience, however, that the discursive prowess of students should not be underestimated, and that they, following the priming exercise of Logbook in-

structions 1 and the close support of the teacher who may introduce a climate for such perspectives during classes, can utilise the second log proposed here as a toolbox. If further considering the second logbook exercise as superseding the first, they can continue their notes over time, addressing and revisiting different questions at any given moment and bring their notebook to the performance classes to oversee and revitalise their development with the teacher functioning as a sparring partner. (The teacher could, of course, be exchanged for a private sparring partner if the practitioner is not enrolled in a formal training programme.) This transcending knowledge or wisdom, *philo-Sophia*, can trigger important self-reflective impulses which, when situating ourselves as part of a whole, rather than mere 'victims' of a judging audience, can make us grow as individuals. It can provide a safe space (provided that we trust our sparring partner) to identify, pursue and explore other developmental values beyond course-curriculum, learning goals and other politically, culturally and socially defined ideals. According to Spinoza, those who have a positive impact on others will feel pleasure, particularly when identifying themselves as the cause of that action, and vice versa (Spinoza, 2015, loc. 1809).

Concluding thoughts

Realistically, a few critical questions during an introverted practising session does not a democratic, empathic citizen make, and that is not at all what we have hoped to achieve either. What is at stake is to bring these matters to the agenda and devise pedagogical tools to initiate a process—plant a seed, so-to-speak—leading to virtue and growth beyond the generally accepted boundaries of learning to play an instrument. As we see music instrument education, it is not a matter of recruiting un-knowing students and learn them a complete skill (such as programming, the use of software, welding, plumbing, etc.). Rather, it is to recruit already experienced musicians and perform an intervention in which we help them stake out a course of development

and accumulating skills long after receiving their degree. Similarly, the method proposed here, as well as the overall philosophical argument of potential spaces, transformative processes, empathy and democracy, is not to be considered learning outcomes to be achieved within the course of the study. Instead, it is to introduce and learn a way of contemplating and exercising critique in life, that develops students in the long run. It is to crystallise and verbalise questions that re-directs attention from *praxis* and *poesis* to the process of *Socratic Eros t*o explore life more constructively, beyond adhering to predefined norms alone to satisfy an instrumental function in a societal machinery.

In this article we propose logbook-writing as a means of verbalizing and concretising such critique, organized by four levels of questions ranging from self-perception and self-reflectiveness, to how one relates to one-self and others contextually, to understanding communicative music performance as an interaction between two parties based on human insight, and to how we can contribute to and play a part in society. Through this method, we hope to stimulate a shift from a music performance learning centred on the particular and practical (e.g. *poiesis, praxis* and *phronesis* (cf. fig. 1 above) to one that engages with music creation in a broader context to achieve a move to the universal, idealistic through *Socratic Eros.* Said differently, rather than holding phronesis as the end-goal of learning and practising music, it rather becomes a part of the process towards something higher where the S*ocratic Eros* enables us to transition between and cumulatively learn to develop from the different stages of *poiesis, praxis, phronesis,* and *authenticity* (cf. Table 1) to be virtuous "lovers of wisdom", as Hansen so eloquently put it (Hansen, 2007, p. 24).

So, to all aspiring musicians out there, let us use the privilege that having time and opportunity to sit and practice music performance critically to grow as members of society: 'let us practise for democracy! Let us play for a prosperous life!'

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About the Authors

Robin Rolfhamre (PhD) is a professor of music education at the University of Agder, Norway, Department of Classical Music and Music Education. His research is rooted in music pedagogy, early music performance studies, and organology. As a performer, Rolfhamre has released several full albums and performed concerts internationally. Further information: www.rolfhamre.com.

Inga Marie Nesmann-Aas is Research Fellow at the Faculty of Fine Arts, University of Agder. She holds an MA in English Literature and MMus in classical singing. Her PhD-project 'Reconfiguring Dido', investigates new approaches towards textual and musical analysis, post-Historically Informed Performance, interpretation, embodied musical performance and realisations of text and music. Both academic and performance centred perspectives are integral in her research. Her background is in teaching, teacher training, voice pedagogy and as a freelance performer. She is active in several research groups and was chief editor in NJMR, Norwegian eJournal of Music Research (now discontinued) from 2018-2019.